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My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays on consumer behavior.
The first chapter studies demand for experience goods. Consumers behave
very differently when they do not have perfect information about all brands
available on a shelf. This paper extends the benchmark discrete choice model
of consumer demand to capture two distinct features of experience-goods mar-
kets: prior brand experience and shopping frequency. Although the current
literature incorporates habit formation in consumer demand models, it has not
considered a more fundamental question: how the first experience with a brand
affects the consumer’s choice. The model is estimated using data on purchases
of ready-to-drink orange juice, which comes from a new consumer-level panel
provided by a large supermarket chain in Brazil. The results show that for this
product prior experience of a brand is more important for a consumer’s choice
than price. Furthermore, own- and cross-price elasticities change significantly
when experience and shopping frequency are taken into account. The findings
of this chapter have implications for both firms’ strategies and for antitrust
analysis related to experience-goods markets.
The second chapter explores how umbrella branding can significantly de-
crease consumer’s first-time experience cost. Multiproduct firms often market
their products under the same brand name. When a firm launches a new
product with the same brand name, consumers can pool their prior experience
with the brand to infer a quality for the product. This strategy can be par-
ticularly useful when a firm decides to enter a market of experience goods, in
which consumers face a cost for trying a new product. The main objective of
this chapter is to study the process by which consumers’ brand choices and
first-time purchases for ready-to-drink orange juices are affected by their ex-
perience with the same brand in another category. The results are consistent
with signaling theories of umbrella branding as they indicate that consumers’
experience cost with a product decreases with experience of other products of
the same brand.
The third chapter is about a household’s choice of retail formats. Thirty
percent of households’ food expenditure in the United States comes from club-
stores, mass merchandisers, supercenters, drugstores and convenience stores.
However, earlier work focused on consumers’ shopping behavior mostly in gro-
cery stores and has not examined consumers choice across different types of
retail outlets. To address this gap a multinomial logit model is estimated on
household-level scanner data for the United States to study how households’
characteristics are related to their choice of retail outlets. The results show
that income, household size and ethnicity significantly affect these choices.
These findings are important for policies that target certain consumer groups.
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Chapter 1
How Do Experience and
Shopping Frequency Affect
Consumers Brand Choice?
1.1 Introduction
Consumers behave very differently when they do not have perfect informa-
tion about all brands available on a shelf. This paper extends the benchmark
discrete choice model of consumer demand to capture two distinct features
of experience goods markets: prior brand experience and shopping frequency.
Although the current literature incorporates habit formation in consumer de-
mand models, it has not considered a more fundamental question: how the
first experience with a brand affects the consumer’s choice. This question is
addressed using packaged orange juice as an example of an experience good to
estimate a consumer demand model.
Consumers choose among brands of experience goods (e.g., orange juice or
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cereals) differently than they do brands of cameras or DVD players because
the only way to evaluate the brand is to try it. Experience goods are those for
which the consumer needs to pay an inspection cost to learn about how much
she likes a brand and for which the cheapest search mechanism is experience.
In other words, she needs to consume a brand to learn about her own utility
derived from that brand. Foods and beverages are examples of experience
goods (Nelson, 1970).
The main hypothesis of this paper is that ignorance about brands generates
an experience cost. Many theoretical and empirical papers, to be discussed
below, present models in which utility of a brand can be a function of past
consumption. None, however, examines the effect of first-time experience with
a product on consumer demand, the topic of this paper.
The consumer, in this paper, may or may not have experienced the brand
previously. The focus here is on experience costs, which is the part of switching
costs that is related to learning. In this paper the benchmark discrete choice
model of demand is extended to include prior experience, while also accounting
for habit formation. The objective is to estimate the magnitude of experience
costs and evaluate how they affect consumers’ choices. Furthermore, there is
evidence that the number of experiments with brands of a product is closely
related to the frequency of purchases of that product. Therefore, shopping
frequency is incorporate in the model and estimate how it interacts with ex-
perience cost and brand loyalty.
This paper uses a novel consumer-level data set to estimate the model em-
pirically. The data come from a scanner-data panel of 3,000 consumers pro-
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vided by a large supermarket chain in Brazil. The panel is composed of two
years of purchases recorded in consumers’ fidelity card accounts, and include
detailed data of each shopping trip, as well as demographic characteristics.
This type of data is not easily available to academic researchers, and this par-
ticular dataset has not been used in any other work. This is the first time, to
my knowledge, that consumer-level data are used to analyze consumer behav-
ior in Brazil. The disadvantage of this dataset is that it has only information
about one retail chain.
The results of the model imply that, holding all else constant, firms would
have to give their product to consumers for free to compensate for their expe-
rience cost. When prior experience is taken into account, own-price elasticities
decrease, which suggests that standard models over-estimate demand elastic-
ities when applied to experience goods. Moreover, the own-price elasticity is
lower for consumers that have experienced a brand before. Estimated cross-
price elasticities also change significantly. Finally, frequent shoppers are more
loyal to brands.
The findings of this paper are important for a better understanding of con-
sumer behavior in markets of experience goods. As such the paper contributes
to both the industrial organization literature and the marketing literature.
Firm strategies are different in the presence of experience and other switching
costs. When consumers face experience costs, firms with large market shares
could charge higher prices since consumers must incur an experience cost to
switch to new brands. Smaller competitors on the other hand might be forced
to price more aggressively to stimulate experimentation. Experimentation also
makes other strategic variables very important for sales performance, like pack-
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age sizes and free-samples.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents
the results, followed by a discussion of possible implications and extensions in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Search and Experience Problems
The problem of imperfect information for consumer choice has been widely ex-
plored in the theoretical industrial organization literature. There is a variety
of sources of imperfect information one can imagine. There are also a variety
of search mechanisms.
Some papers, such as Diamond (1971), Rothschild (1974) and Rosenfield
and Shapiro (1981), stress the problem of asymmetry of information in price.
That is, consumers have to pay some search cost in order to learn about the
price of the good that they want to buy. In Diamond’s model, firms charge a
monopoly price in equilibrium even if the good is completely homogeneous as
long as there is a positive search cost, even if very small.
Nelson (1970, 1974, 1976) and Wilde (1980) focus on the problem of un-
known valuation or tastes of the goods. Now consumers have full information
about prices, but products are heterogeneous and they do not know their val-
uation for each brand. Customers must pay a cost to learn about how much
4
they like each brand. Nelson (1970) argues that he chooses to focus on lack of
information about quality because that is more costly to acquire than infor-
mation about price. In this paper this is the information problem of interest.1
The method for acquiring information is one of the key features of models
with imperfect information problems about brands. Nelson (1970) makes a
very clear distinction between search and experience problems, which is fol-
lowed in this paper.2 The consumer’s information problem is only to evaluate
the utility of each option. He defines search as any type of evaluating options
subject to two restrictions: i) the consumer must inspect the option; and ii)
inspection must occur prior to the purchase of the brand. The second restric-
tion is what makes search different from experimenting. An experience good
is one for which the least costly evaluating mechanism is the purchase itself.
Many non-durable goods can be classified as experience goods. Food, for in-
stance, is the typical example of an experience good. If one needs to learn
how much he or she likes a certain brand, the easiest and cheapest way to
do it is to eat it. Therefore, one needs to buy it first. An example of a non-
durable good that should not be classified as an experience good is clothing.
One could try a dress before buying it. Trying the dress is a less expensive
evaluation mechanism than purchasing the dress. The search cost involves
time spent traveling to and from the store as well es experimenting at the
store. The experience cost is the utility foregone for the best brand that is
known to the consumer. Moreover Nelson (1970) shows that the number of
experiments with brands of a product is positively related to the frequency of
purchases of that product. This motivates the inclusion of an interaction term
1Kohn and Shavell (1974), Wolinsky (1983, 1984), and Wolinsky (1986) model both
sources of imperfect information.
2Nelson (1970) uses the term search more narrowly than Stigler (1961) and Stigler (1962).
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between shopping frequency and experience in the demand model of this paper.
While Nelson (1970, 1974, 1976) focuses on experience problems, he does
not explicitly solve the optimization problem of the consumer. Villas-Boas
(2006) designs a model in which there is a firm duopoly, and goods are hetero-
geneous and non-durable3. The outcome of the model captures some important
and interesting features of experience good markets. First, after experiencing
a good fit, consumers find it too costly to experiment further. Also, after a
large number of consumers have a positive experience with a firm, that firm
charges a higher price to exploit those consumers’ positive experience. This
result is complementary to the literature of switching costs. By introducing
experience into the model, one can endogenize part of switching costs. This
idea is present in a few recent papers such as Villas-Boas (2004, 2006), Klem-
perer (2002), Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) and Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and
Jullien (1990).
1.2.2 Discrete choice models of demand estimation
Seminal work by Lancaster (1971) and McFadden (1974) have laid the ground
for the use of discrete choice models in demand estimation for differentiated
products. In these models, products are considered as a collection of char-
acteristics, and consumers choose the one that maximizes the utility derived
from the product’s characteristics. With this approach many brands can be
projected onto a space of only a few characteristics. Thus, researchers can get
around the curse of dimensionality of traditional systems of demand.
3In each period there is a new generation of consumers that enter the market. Consumers
live only for two periods and can only consume one unit of the good. In each period, the firms
choose the price such as to maximize the expected value of their profits. The equilibrium
concept used in the model is the Markov perfect equilibrium Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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In the traditional approach of demand estimation, there are J brands in
the model. That means there will be J equations and each equation will have
J parameters to estimate. Each equation specifies the demand for a brand as a
function of its own price, the prices of other brands, and other variables. That
means at least J × (J + 1) parameters to be estimated in the system. Even
ten brands can make the model intractable. On the other hand, the number
of parameters in a discrete choice model does not grow with the number of
alternatives but with the number of characteristics. Own- and cross-price elas-
ticities are functions of the estimated parameters, so are not identified directly
from the estimates as they are in traditional demand models. This has enabled
researchers to include more brands in the demand model. This is particularly
beneficial for analyses of differentiated goods.
In the literature of empirical industrial organization, Berry (1994) and
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) have shown how these models can be al-
tered to be used with aggregate data on market shares. The BLP framework
became the most widely used model for demand estimation in industrial orga-
nization when only market-level price and quantity data are available. They
also have improved on the previous literature by dealing with price endogene-
ity4.
There have been few papers that estimate demand models with individual-
4In discrete choice models of demand price and product characteristics enter demand
equations in a non-linear fashion. This frustrates the use of straightforward instrumental
variable methods, which rely on a linearity assumption. Most discrete-choice demand models
treat price as exogenous, but this can be a even more serious problem when aggregated data
is being used. In demand models with consumer-level data the source of price endogeneity is
not the traditional one. The problem is the potential unobserved quality that might be part
of the stochastic term and be correlated with prices. However, as long as this unobserved
quality does not vary over time, it can be picked up by alternative-specific constants.
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level data in the empirical industrial organization literature. Ackerberg (2001,
2003) uses consumer-level scanner data to model the impact of persuasive and
informative advertisements in consumers choice of a brand of yogurt. Hendel
and Nevo (2006) use scanner data to measure the impact of sales and con-
sumer behavior on demand of storable goods. On the other hand,Guadagni
and Little (1983)’s seminal paper has started a large literature in marketing
on choice models estimated using scanner data.
Many papers have used past consumption in models of consumer choice.
Ackerberg (2001, 2003), Hendel and Nevo (2006), Costantino (2008) and Os-
borne (2005) are examples in the empirical industrial organization literature.
In marketing, Guadagni and Little (1983), Erdem (1996), Keane (1997), and
Shum (2004), among others have included variables related to consumption
history to incorporate habit formation and brand loyalty.
This paper contributes to both the industrial organization and marketing
literature by extending the benchmark consumer discrete choice demand model
to include features of experience goods markets. Despite the introduction of
prior experience and shopping frequency, the model is fairly tractable and
straightforward to compare with the benchmark model.
1.3 Model
In order to model the demand for packaged orange juice, this paper follows
the current literature in using a discrete choice model of consumer demand for
differentiated products.
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1.3.1 Benchmark Model of Consumer Demand
First the benchmark discrete choice model for consumer demand is introduced.
There are J alternatives available for the consumer.5 The consumer selects
alternative j that gives her the highest indirect utility, Uij. The indirect utility
can be decomposed into observable and unobservable parts. For each alter-
native j ∈ J in the shopping trip t, the indirect utility of individual i can be
written as
Uij = ξj + αPijt + βk
K∑
k=1
Xjkt + θjm
M∑
m=1
Yim + ijt (1.1)
where ξj is an alternative-specific constant; Pijt is the price offered to consumer
i for the module-brand j at purchase occasion t; Xjkt is a vector of alternative-
specific characteristics k at occasion t; Yi is a vector of socio-demographic
variables; and ijt is the random component for consumer i, brand j and time
t. The alternative-specific constant captures the average effect on utility of
all factors that are not included in the model (e.g. intrinsic quality). 6 It is
important to control for that to avoid endogeneity problems in the price vari-
able as quality is expected to be correlated with prices. Social-demographic
variables do not vary with j, only with i, thus only differences in θ’s can be
estimated. That implies that the consumer characteristics are only relevant
5Each alternative in this paper is a module-brand. Module is the combination of size,
container type (bottle or UHT container) and variety (light or regular). In the estimations,
J = 12.
6In the empirical IO literature, it is common to see a ξjt term that varies with time in
models of consumer demand, as first introduced by Berry (1994). Advertisement that varies
over time is the main example used in the literature for this term. Packaged orange juice was
intentionally selected as a product that has low intensity advertising to avoid addressing this
issue. Since the model is estimated with consumer-level data, the BLP method to correct
for the endogeneity caused by the ξjt term cannot be used.
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to the model if they create differences in utility over alternatives. The unob-
served part of the utility, ijt, is assumed to be distributed as type I extreme
value. The extreme value distribution leads to the logit formula for the choice
probabilities. The multinomial logit is by far the most widely used discrete
choice model. The fact that the choice probabilities have closed form is one of
the reasons for its popularity.
The choice probability is Probi(y = j) = Prob(Uij > Uil) for Yj 6= l. How-
ever, the absolute level of utility is irrelevant for the decision maker and for the
econometrician. Only differences in utility matter. So the choice probability
can be rewritten as Prob(Uij −Uil > 0) for Yj 6= l. As the error term is type I
extreme value, then these choice probabilities take the well known logit form:
Probit(y = j) =
exp(ξj + αPijt + βk
∑K
k=1 Xjkt + θjm
∑M
m=1 Yim)∑J
l=1 exp(ξl + αPilt + βk
∑K
k=1Xlkt + θlm
∑M
m=1 Yim)
(1.2)
It can be noticed from Equation 1.1 that the consumer knows everything
there is to know about each module-brand offered in the market. The only
unknown part of her utility of a brand is specific to the purchase occasion t.
1.3.2 Extended Model of Consumer Demand for Expe-
rience Goods
Prior experience is introduced to the model in order to capture the experience
cost incurred due to lack of information about brands in the market. More-
over, shopping frequency is included in the model because of its hypothetical
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impact on the willingness to try new brands. Brand loyalty is also controlled
for to ensure that the fist-time experience variable does not capture other
types of habit formation other than learning. This variable controls for state
dependence in the consumer’s utility.
Prior experience enters the consumer’s utility function as a dummy variable
which is equal to one if she has never purchased the brand and is equal to zero
if she has purchased that brand before. The variable is coded in this way so
that its estimated coefficient reflects the experience cost of trying a new brand.
This paper follows other work from the marketing literature (e.g. Guadagni
and Little 1983 for the definition of the brand loyalty variable (BLijt).
Exijt =

1 if the brand of j has not been purchased previously by consumer i ,
0 otherwise.
The models are estimated with three alternative specifications of that vari-
able as a robustness check: (i) the simplest version is a dummy that captures
if brand b has been purchased in the past shopping trip; (ii) brand loyalty is
equal to the number of times that the consumer has purchased the brand in
past observed shopping trips; and (iii) the brand loyalty variable as specified
in Guadagni and Little (1983) as an exponentially smoothed weighted average
of lagged purchase indicators, GLijt = δGLijt−1 + (1− δ)dijt−1, where dijt−1 is
an indicator function equal to one if the consumer purchased brand j at t− 1,
and zero otherwise.
Some alternatives belong to the same brand and therefore are simply dif-
ferent alternatives because they are offered in different packages or types. For
these cases the experience and brand loyalty variables are the same. If a con-
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sumer buys Xando 300 ml at t, the experience dummy will be switched off for
Xando 1L as well from t + 1 on. The same approach is taken for the brand
loyalty variable.
Shopping frequency is modeled as the number of days since the last shop-
ping trip. It is is denoted by Duit for duration. There is no subscript t on it
because it does not vary with alternative j. This is a consumer’s shopping trip
specific variable. Thus, only the difference in its coefficients can be identified.
Two types of duration are calculated: (i) duration between every visit that the
consumer makes to the supermarket (Duit), and (ii) duration between trips
where orange juice was purchased. The latter is denoted by DuOJit. The
model is estimated with both variables, but the first one should better capture
the type of consumer shopping behavior (i.e. frequent or not frequent shop-
per). The inclusion of DuOJit in the model can also cause concerns about
endogeneity. It is easier to argue that Duit is exogenous to the choice of pack-
aged orange juice.
Because the reason to include shopping frequency is to access how het-
erogeneity in shopping behavior affects experience cost and loyalty to brands,
experience and brand loyalty are interacted with median duration between
shopping trips for each consumer. That is, consumers are allowed to have
different experience cost and loyalty to brands depending on their s¨hopping
types¨. Previous research shows evidence on the relationship between experi-
ence and shopping frequency but, to my knowledge, it has never been formally
tested.
Therefore, consumer i’s utility for alternative j at shopping trip t is given
12
by
Uij = ξj+αPijt+βk
K∑
k=1
Xjkt+θjm
M∑
m=1
Yim+δExijt+λBLijt+κDuit+ϕExijt×Duit+ijt
(1.3)
Define the deterministic part of the the utility as Vijt
7 :
Vijt = ξj+αPijt+βk
K∑
k=1
Xjkt+θjm
M∑
m=1
Yim+δExijt+λBLijt+κjDui+ϕExijt×Duit
(1.4)
The new logit probabilities are given by Equation 1.5:
Probit(y = j) =
exp(Vijt)∑J
l=1 exp(Vilt)
(1.5)
The novelty of this paper is the introduction of experience (Exijt) and shop-
ping frequency (Duit and Exijt ×Duit) in the discrete choice demand model.
By doing so stylized features of the experience market are incorporated into
the model, thereby eliminating the estimation problems related to the assump-
tion of perfect information for this type of product. Although learning here is
myopic, the model is still fairly easy to estimate. It also allows the researcher
to make direct comparisons with the results of the benchmark model.
7In the literature Vijt is called representative utility. It is a function of observable vari-
ables (the regressors) and parameters that are unknown to the econometrician and therefore
must be estimated.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Description
The model is estimated on consumer-level panel data on grocery purchases
provided by a large supermarket chain in Brazil. The dataset consists of pur-
chase information of fidelity card members who scan their card when they
pay. This information is paired with the household’s demographic information
provided when they signed up with the fidelity program.
The dataset contains information on 3,000 consumers from January 2005
to December 2006, inclusive. Every product that the consumer buys is one
observation, so the data come in their most disaggregated format. The panel
covers food, beverages, and many non-food items commonly found in super-
markets.
The socio-demographic variables provided in the panel are income, gender,
age, number of people in a household8, occupation, schooling and residential
zip code. Since consumers fill out the form only once, characteristics are con-
stant within a household.
The purchase specific variables are name of each product, brand, package
size, quantity, price, discount value, date of purchase and code of the store.
8The variable number of people in the household unfortunately does not seem to be
reliable, because of the excess of zeros in the data. This variable is problematic because of
the way the question is posed in the form. They ask how many dependents are there in the
household, and that might leave room for misunderstanding. If a housewife is filling the
form, she might not consider her husband as her dependent even if he lives in the house.
Indeed 60% of the housewives in the data answered that there were zero dependents in the
households; this seems rather odd. Their objective was to get information on the number
of people in the household, but they just seemed to ask the wrong question. Therefore this
variable is not used in the analysis.
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Women represent 60% of the sample. The median and mean age are 50
years. The average monthly income in the sample is R$ 3,145 and the median
is R$ 2,400.9 On average, there are 106 recorded shopping trips per consumer
in these 26 months. Consumers spend R$50 on average per trip and buy 14
different products.
1.4.2 Ready-to-drink orange juice
This paper focuses on purchases of packaged ready-to-drink orange juice. This
product category is chosen as it can be a good example of an experience good.
Consumer need to drink each alternative to be able to rank them in terms of
their utility. It is also difficult for firms to communicate information about
it’s products’ “taste”. Moreover the whole category of ready-to-drink juices is
new in Brazil relative to other countries. This is a market that emerged only
in the end of the nineties. Therefore consumers in my sample do not have a
long history of consumption with the product. This is relevant as the focus of
the paper is on first-time experience.
Only consumers that have bought this product at least ten times are used
in the sample. Furthermore, only consumers of the state of Sa˜o Paulo are kept
to minimize issues of product availability10. Using these criteria the sample
has 221 consumers and 6,092 shopping trips during which packaged orange
9Income per capita in the state of Sa˜o Paulo in 2005 was R$ 1,247 per month. The
average exchange rate in 2005 was 2.44 R$/US$, and 2.17 R$/US$ in 2006 (source: IPEA).
10Availability is a common problem for empirical papers of consumer choice. In most
cases, there are no data on what alternatives were available to the decision maker at the
time of purchase. In general the assumption is that every alternative is always available.
That is what is assumed in this paper as well. It does not generate any serious problems
for estimations as long as products are randomly unavailable: that is, if availability is not
correlated with any of the observables. Restricting the region helps us avoid this issue, as
some brands might not be offered everywhere in the country.
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juice was purchased. That represents roughly 20% of the total number of vis-
its to the grocery store recorded by these consumers.
Consumers alternatives for ready-to-drink orange juice are a combination
of brands and modules. Module is defined as a combination of size, container
type (bottle or UHT container) and variety (light or regular). For instance,
Maguary, one of the brands, is sold in three different formats: regular juice in a
1 liter UHT package, light juice in a 1 liter UHT package and regular juice in a
200 milliliter UHT container. These three types have different characteristics,
including price. Therefore I chose to consider them as different alternatives for
the consumer. This approach is very similar to related papers in the literature.
The total number of purchases by a consumer of a particular module-brand
combination is set to be the number of observed shopping trips during which
the household purchased at least one item of that module-brand. A trip counts
as a single purchase regardless of how many units were bought of the same
module-brand11. A single brand may be sold in multiple modules.
Additional Sample Characteristics
There are 20 different brands of packaged orange juice in the sample and 28
module-brand combinations. Twelve module-brand combinations are used for
estimation covering 7 brands. This accounts for 83% of the market share of
those alternatives in the dataset. The market share of the leading brands are
33%, 22% and 9%, which is very close to the actual market share of those
11If two different module-brands are observed in the same shopping trip, then that shop-
ping trip is duplicated. It has exactly the same characteristics as the first one but it will
refer to the other alternative. In other words, a shopping trip with two module-brands
becomes two observations in my data. The same procedure is followed if more than two
module-brands are purchased in a single shopping trip.
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brands in Sa˜o Paulo in that period. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
for the market is 1759. For the sake of comparison, an individual concentra-
tion index is calculated using the same formula as the market HHI, but instead
of calculating the level of concentration for a market, the index is calculated
for each individual12. The average individual consumer’s HHI is 5369.13This
difference between market concentration and consumer choice concentration
reflects brand heterogeneity in this market14. The expenditure on orange juice
is, as expected, much more concentrated than the market itself. Figure 1.1 in
the appendix shows the distribution of consumers for number of brands and
module-brands. The median consumer buys four brands over the whole sam-
ple considering all the twenty brands. In two years, 10% of consumers only
buy two. There is no individual that is observed ever spanning all brands over
the sample period.
The median orange juice consumer shops on average every five days and
buys orange juice every 15 days. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the appendix show the
distributions of days between shopping trips. The median consumer spends R$
67 in each visit, but spends R$ 82.71 in visits in which she purchases orange
juice.
Figure 1.4 shows that more frequent consumers have tried more brands
over the sample period. For illustrative purposes, I divided consumers into
12To compute the ”consumer’s HHI”, the share of each brand in the consumers expendi-
ture with packaged orange juice in the sample period is calculated. The index is the sum
of squares of these market shares. In the limit, if each consumer only purchased one brand
then the individual HHI would be one.
13From this point, descriptive statistics or comments always refer to the restricted sample
of 221 packaged orange juice consumers.
14In a market with homogenous goods and no transportation cost, these two indexes
should be the same. Differences in market share would only be explained by differences in
firms’ cost structure.
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two groups according to their median duration (i.e., number of days) between
orange juice shopping trips. Individuals that shop more than once a month
were classified as frequent consumers, and the others as infrequent consumers.
The median frequent consumer purchases three new brands over the sample,
and the median infrequent consumer purchases two.
1.4.3 Data for the Discrete Choice Model
In order to estimate a multinomial model the data must be arranged in long
format. In other words, for every purchase occasion the dataset must have
J rows of data (one for each alternative, j = 1, . . . , J). A dataset with N
observations, therefore expands to N × J observations. 15
Multiple module-brand purchases in one shopping trip
Multiple module-brands bought in one single shopping trip by a consumer
can be problematic for a discrete choice model, because only one alternative
can be chosen at a time. Some researchers define criteria to select which
products to consider, and drop the secondary ones. However, for this paper
it is important to keep track of all purchases of orange juice module-brands
because consumers’ purchase histories are of central interest. In order to avoid
loss of information, the following method is used: if two different module-
brands are observed in the same shopping trip, then that shopping trip is
duplicated. The second trip has exactly the same characteristics as the first
one (total expenditure in the shopping trip and number of days since last trip),
but it refers to the other alternative. In other words, a shopping trip with two
module-brands becomes two observations in my dataset. One observation
has all the characteristics of one brand-module (price, product characteristics,
15Notice the total number of observations becomes N ×J because of the assumption that
individuals always have the option of buying any of the J alternatives
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prior experience and habit with the product) and the characteristics of the
shopping trip. The characteristics of the brand-module change for the second
observation but the shopping trip characteristics are identical. In long format,
there will be 2
timesJ for each shopping trip with purchases of two module-brands of orange
juice.
Prices
The model the takes into account choice of module-brands but not the quan-
tity purchased in a shopping trip. However, packages of ready-to-drink orange
juices come in different sizes. Therefore a 1L-equivalent price is calculated
in order to make it comparable across the different alternatives. The average
unit price of the 200ml packages is lower than the average unit price of the
1L packages, but that does not mean that they are cheaper. Table 1.1 shows,
for instance, that the Kapo 200 ml costs R$3.64 per one liter while Del Vale
1L costs R$2.67 per liter. But if one would compare the unit price of Kapo
200 ml without adjusting for its size with the unit price of Del Vale, it would
seem that the first is cheaper than the latter. It is more reasonable to assume
that consumers choose according to weight-equivalent prices instead. Thus the
latter is the variable that is used in the analysis.
Only prices paid by consumers are observable in the dataset: a common
feature of scanner data. However the model requires data on all alternatives,
including those not chosen, to empirically identify the parameters of interest.
Therefore values are imputed for the missing prices. The steps for imputation
are the following: i) generate a price imputation dataset with a price for each
module-brand for each day during the sample period; ii) calculate price for
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alternative j at day t as a weighted average of the prices that consumers paid
for it on that day;16 iii) carry forward prices for the remaining missing values
in the price imputation dataset;17 iv) substitute all the missing prices in the
main dataset by the corresponding values from the price imputation dataset.
Observations of the city of Sa˜o Paulo and the other cities of the state are sep-
arated for imputing prices. The same steps listed above are followed in each
subset.
Value discounts are observed in the dataset. However only non-discounted
prices are used in the model for two reasons: 1) less than 2% of the purchases
have been done using coupons, and 2) to avoid endogeneity problems. Erdem,
Keane, and Sun (1998) discuss this problem. Coupons are only observed for
the chosen alternatives. One cannot assume that all consumers have access
to the same coupons as is done with prices. Moreover, consumers might have
coupons that they do not use, which the researcher does not observe. But
if a coupon value is included as a variable in the model, that value of the
unused coupon should have been there. If coupons are simply set to zero for
the unchosen alternatives, then the estimated marginal effect of that variable
will be over-estimated. Another way to see the endogeneity problem is that if
the value of a coupon in positive in the dataset, then it perfectly predicts the
consumer’s choice. The same problem would arise if the price variable would
be constructed as P dijt = Pijt − Couponijt. Although the endogeneity problem
is now more subtle, it is still present. The price sensitivity of consumers would
be over-estimated. The fact that consumers do have coupons is not a problem
16In some cases the prices are all the same, and then the average is just equal to that
value.
17There is a missing value for a module-brand j at day t if no consumer bought it that
day.
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as long as coupons are independently distributed18.
Alternative characteristics
Four product characteristics are included in the consumer’s utility in addition
to price: i) if the module-brand has added sugar, ii) if it is light or regular, iii)
if it is nectar or juice, and iv) size.
Leco and Maguary are the only brands that offer light versions of their
juices and are offered in a 1L container. Both also offer the same container
size of the regular juice. Light is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the
juice is labelled as light, and 0 otherwise.
Out of the 27 module-brands in the supermarket, only 7 of them are offered
in smaller sizes (200 ml or 300 ml), and only 3 brands offer only small contain-
ers. Most of packaged orange juices in supermarkets come in 1L containers.
Small containers represent 14% of consumers’ choices in the sample used for
estimation. Size enters the model as a continuous variable.
The distinction between nectar and juice in Brazil is very similar to the
one in other countries. Most countries define a standard purity for a beverage
to be considered a “fruit juice”. This name is generally reserved for beverages
that are 100% fruit juice. In Brazil, any beverage with 30% concentration of
orange juice can be called nectar of orange.19 In the United States a nectar
must contain between 35% to 50% depending on the fruit.20 Thus a nectar is
18If individuals acquire coupons because of previous purchase of a module-brand, then
the effect of those coupons will be absorbed by the brand loyalty variable
19In Brazil Law no. 8.918 of 1994 defines the standards, classification, inspection, regis-
tration and production of all beverages.
20In the United States the FDA and USDA define the standards for beverages.
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more diluted than a juice and may contain artificial sweeteners. Brazilian law
limits the addition of non-artificial sugar to only 10% of the weight of juices.
Only a few packaged orange juices are classified as nectars in Brazil (3 brands
out of 20). In the set of alternatives of my model the only module brand that
has added sugar is the Kapo 200 ml. Table 1.1 shows the average prices of the
module-brands that are used for estimation. As expected the average price
for nectars is slightly lower than the average price of juices. Nectar enters the
model as an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the module-brand is labeled
as nectar, and is 0 otherwise.
These characteristics are displayed on the product’s container. The orange
juice containers also have information on calories, carbohydrates and amount
of vitamin C. But they do not appear to affect significantly the consumers’
choice between module-brands when condition on four characteristics listed
above.
1.5 Results
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the main results. The models are estimated using
either alternative fixed effects or a set of alternative specific characteristics.
They cannot be included simultaneously because the module-brand character-
istics described above are constant over time, unlike price. However, the price
elasticities and the marginal effects of the main variables of interest do not
change significantly between these specifications.
The first columns of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the results of a standard dis-
crete choice demand model. For the former table, alternative-specific constants
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and price are included. For the latter table, price and alternative character-
istics are included. Both models imply very similar price elasticities. The
estimated price coefficient (αˆijt) is equal to -0.279 for the first model and -
0.305 for the second model.
The marginal effect tells us by how much the probability of buying a cer-
tain module-brand of orange juice changes when the price of module-brand j
changes, that is, the change in the probability that decision maker i chooses
alternative j given a change in Pijt. The derivative of Probit(y = j) with
respect to Pilt is calculated as
δVijt
δPilt
Probit(y = j)Probit(y = l). If j = l,
then δProbit(y=j)
δPilt
=
δVijt
δPilt
Probit(y = j)(1 − Probit(y = j)).21 When Vijt is lin-
ear in prices, then the marginal effect can be written as Pijt = −αProbit(y =
j)Probit(y = l)
22. The own-price elasticities are calculated as Ejj =
δVijt
δPijt
Pijt(1−
Probit(y = j))
23 The cross-price elasticities are Ejl =
δVijt
δPilt
PiltProbit(y = l).
24.
Tables 1.4 reports marginal effects and price elasticities for the benchmark
demand model. Since the estimated price coefficient (αˆijt) is slightly smaller
when the model is estimated with alternative specific coefficients than with
alternative characteristics, the own-price elasticities implied by this model are
also smaller. Module-brands offered in small containers have own-price elas-
21Since the marginal effect depends on the choice probabilities, that means that the y
also depend on the values of the regressors. Just as in any other non-linear model, the
magnitude of the marginal effects always depends upon where you evaluate them at. The
derivative is largest at Probit(y = j) = 0.5. As a result of the sigmoid-shaped probability.
This implies that the larger the degree of uncertainty regarding a choice, the larger the
impact of an observable variable on the change of the choice probability. In tables 1.4 and
?? those derivatives are evaluated at the mean values of the regressors.
22The marginal effects of other continuous variables are computed in exactly the same
way.
23If Vijt is linear in prices, then
δVijt
δPijt
= −α
24Notice that the cross-elasticity is the same for all j. A decrease in price of an alternative
reduces the probabilities for all the other alternatives by the same percentage. This is a
manifestation of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. Proportional
substitution is the main drawback of multinomial logit models.
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ticites larger than 1, and the 1L module-brands all have estimated elasticities
between 0.6 and 1. Therefore consumers are less sensitive to changes in prices
of larger containers. The cross-price elasticities of the small module-brands are
lower than the ones of the 1L products of the same brand. This implies that
a change in prices of orange juices offered in small containers steals less mar-
ket share from competitors than if the same proportional change in prices of
the larger containers is observed. In the model with alternative dummies, the
light juices have the lowest price cross-elasticities perhaps due to consumers
perceiving these products as more distant from the others. In the model with
alternative characteristics cross-price elasticities are more similar to each other.
Columns 2 to 6 of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show results of the demand model
with experience. In most discrete choice models, the ratio of coefficients has
an economic meaning: the ratio of alternative characteristics’ coefficients re-
flects the marginal rate of substitution between these two characteristics. In
particular, all else equal, the ratio between the experience coefficient and the
price coefficient shows the consumer’s willingness to pay for knowledge about
a brand.25 This reflects the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between
these variables. In the third column of table 1.2 the estimated coefficients for
price and experience are -0.210 and -1.909, respectively26. The ratio of the
latter to the former implies that, all else constant, consumers are willing to
pay roughly R$ 10 per liter more for a brand of orange juice that they have
25Ignoring the interaction between experience and shopping frequency (i.e. ϕ = 0),take
the total derivative of Equation 1.3, holding constant all variables other than price and
experience and set it to zero to hold utility constant: dU = αP +δEx. The marginal rate of
substitution can be calculated by solving for the change in price that would maintain utility
constant for switching on the experience variable. dPdEx = − δα . If the interaction between
experience and shopping frequency is also included in the model (i.e. ϕ is allowed to be
different than zero), then dPdEx = − δ+ϕ×Duiα .
26Column 3 of table 1.2 displays the results of the model estimated with experience and
brand loyalty (with exponential discounting).
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already purchased. This ratio ranges from R$ 12.94 to R$3.44 in columns
3 to 6 of Tables 1.2 and 1.2. Given that the average prices of the different
brands range from R$ 2.37 to R$ 5.69 per liter, this result implies that firms
would have to give away their products for free in order to compensate for
the consumer’s ignorance about that brand. One could test if the experience
cost is statistically significant from the mean price or the maximum price of
the product. Using a Wald-type test of non-linear hypothesis, the experience
cost implied by column 3 (R$ 9.10) is statically different at 1% significance
level from R$ 3.20, which is the mean price for packaged orange juice in the
sample. The estimated ratio is also different from the mean price of the the
most expensive juice in the market at 10% significance level. Using the most
conservative estimates of experience cost on Table 1.2, one cannot reject the
null hypothesis of the Wald test that the ratio and the prices (both mean and
maximum) are statistically different from each other. This results suggests
free samples can be very important to compensate uninformed consumers for
the experience cost that they face.
The marginal effect of experience is large compared to the marginal effect
of price regardless of the brand loyalty variable used. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 dis-
play the results of the model estimated with the three specifications of the
loyalty variable introduced in Section 1.3.2. The marginal rate of substitution
between experience and price ranges from R$ 4.50 to R$ 11. This is an im-
portant result because it separately identifies two different parts of switching
costs: i) experience cost and ii) habit formation or brand loyalty. In the case
of brands of packaged orange juice the experience cost seems to be significant.
Separating the two is important since each type of switching cost might imply
a different strategy for the firm.
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In the fifth column of Tables 1.2 and 1.3, an interaction between price and
experience is added. The own-price elasticities of a brand are roughly twice as
large for unexperienced consumers than for experienced consumers. The inter-
action between price and experience is no longer significant in column 6 when
the interaction between loyalty and price is included. The price sensitivity
coefficient implied by estimates in column 6 ranges from -0.316 for non-loyal
customers to -0.151 to perfectly loyal customers27. Therefore, consumers that
are loyal to a brand have a lower price elasticity to that brand.
This is in line with results from the switching cost literature (e.g. Villas-
Boas (2006)) that say that non-loyal consumers have more price sensitive de-
mand than loyal ones.28 As a result, a firm with small market share that faces
a large number of uninformed consumers is likely to price more aggressively.
A market leader, on the other hand, has many informed consumers, so its
optimal strategy might be to charge high prices to harvest its loyal customers.
Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the results with shopping fre-
quency in the model. The aim of introducing shopping frequency is to in-
vestigate the impact of different shopping patterns on experimentation and
habit formation. The variable of interest is the interaction between frequency
and experience, and frequency and loyalty, not frequency per se. Shopping
frequency is expected to have an impact on the decision of purchasing orange
27Perfectly loyal customers would be those individuals for which the GLijt measure is
equal to one. That is the case when the consumer always purchases the same brand.
28In Villas-Boas (2004) and Villas-Boas (2006), consumers are considered loyal to a brand
if they have chosen that brand in the last period. The equilibrium concept used in the
paper is Markov Perfect, therefore only the decision of the last period matters. Moreover
his consumers only live for two periods, so they can only be considered loyal consumers in
the second period. The objective of this strategy is to make the problem more tractable.
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juice in a certain shopping trip, but not to affect the choice between the dif-
ferent brand-modules of orange juice. As explained previously the model can
only identify the differential impact of a case-specific variable (i.e. a variable
that only varies with i but not with j) on the choice of each alternative. Shop-
ping frequency is modeled as the median for each consumer of the number of
days between each shopping trip. The marginal effect of experience becomes
larger as median duration increases. The results imply that high frequency
consumers have higher switching costs than those that go less frequently to
the supermarket. This is consistent with papers that show that there is ad-
diction in brand choice. One could interpret these findings as implying that if
a consumer stays out of the market long enough his loyalty diminishes. More-
over, for packaged orange juice, shopping frequency affects the switching cost
related to the loyalty variable but not the first-time experience cost.29
1.5.1 Robustness Checks
Specification of the habit formation variable.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results of the model with different specification
for the brand loyalty variable. Likelihood ratio tests show that, when that
variable is set to be equal to the number of times a brand has been purchased,
the model has the worse fit. The best fit is achieved with the Guadagni and
Little (1983) specification. That is also the specification that generates the
largest marginal effect for habit formation.
29One concern with this exercise is that consumers might go with the same frequency to
the supermarket but spend different amounts. The models of Tables 1.2 were re-estimated
including the monthly total expenditure on ready-to-drink orange juice to evaluate if the
results between frequency and switching costs were robust. The estimated coefficients on
the interaction of duration and experience and on the interaction between duration and
loyalty did not change.
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Nevertheless, estimating the model with any of the three specification of
the habit formation variable shows that consumers of packaged orange juice
are loyal to brands, as the estimated marginal effect for those variables are
positive, large and significant. The marginal effect of experience is also large
and significant no matter which specification of brand loyalty is used.
Income Effect
Table 1.7 presents results of the model including income. The first column of
this Table is column 6 of Table 1.2, and the remaining four columns augment
this model with income effects. The specification on column 6 of Table 1.2
was chosen as benchmark for two reasons: 1) a likelihood ratio test suggests
that this specification dominates the ones of the other columns30, and 2) it
provides the most conservative estimates of experience cost in the paper.
Income enters the model as a set of dummy variables: 1) a dummy that
takes on the value of one if the consumer’s income falls above the 25th per-
centile and below the 75th percentile, and 2) a dummy that is set to one if
the consumer’s income is above the 75th percentile. Column 2 of Table 1.7
includes these indicator variables in the model. A likelihood ratio test favors
this specification against the first column indicating a significant effect of in-
come on brand choice. However, allowing the price sensitivity coefficient to
vary with income in column 3 does not improve the model.
30Note that the specification on column 6 of Table 1.2 nests all the other columns. So it can
be considered the unrestricted specification of the model in the context of the likelihood ratio
test. The null hypothesis is that additional restrictions involved in defining the restricted
form of the model are not rejected by the data. If the null is rejected using the LR test,
the restrictions are not compatible with the data. Thus, the rejection of the null favors the
unrestricted model (i.e. column 6 against all other columns).
28
While the differential price sensitivity coefficients came out insignificant,
splitting the sample for consumers with income below and above the median
reveals different price sensitivity coefficients and experience costs. Results for
the split sample are presented in columns 4 and 5. From estimates in column
4, lower income consumers face an experience cost of R$ 4.35. Higher-income
consumers face a larger experience cost of R$ 4.94 according to estimates
in column 5. That makes sense as lower-income consumers are more price
sensitive than higher-income ones. Price sensitivity coefficients are -0.445 and
-0.380, respectively. Moreover loyalty reduces more own-price elasticities for
the first group than the second.
The effect of censoring on the estimated experience cost.
Because consumer purchases are not observed since their very first purchase
of ready-to-drink orange juice, the model is estimated with different sample
sizes. For Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10, the experience and loyalty variables are
constructed using the whole sample, but different sample sizes are used for
estimation. The model is estimated dropping the first 5, 10 and 15 shopping
trips for each consumer. The results remain qualitatively the same.
While the results remain qualitatively the same, left censoring of the data
might introduce a bias, especially with respect to the magnitude of the expe-
rience cost. Therefore experience cost, based on column 6 of Table 1.2, are
computed for different samples. This specification was chosen over the others
for the same aforementioned reasons. Estimated experience costs are plotted
in Figure 1.5. This Figure suggests that there is an upward bias. Although
the estimates on experience cost decrease as the number of initial shopping
trips excluded from the estimation increases, it is never lower than R$ 3.34.
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It ranges from R$ 3.34 to R$ 5.49. The estimates of Figure 1.5 come from
column 6 of Table 1.2. For comparison purposes, the average price of each
brand of one-liter equivalent packaged orange juices ranges from R$ 2.37 to
R$ 5.70. The average price paid for the product across brands over the sam-
ple period is R$ 3.20, which is lower than the estimated experience cost in
any specification of the model. Thus the conclusion that, holding everything
else constant, firms need to give their product for free to convince uninformed
consumers to try their product for the first time remains valid.
One could also attempt to predict the size of the measurement error in the
experience variable caused by the left censoring of the data. A simple graph of
range of the experience variable (Figure 1.6) suggests that as consumers visit
the supermarket the variable is more likely to be set equal to zero, which is
expected given the way it is specified. In the first day of the sample, experience
is equal to one for all consumers, which motivates the robustness analyses
performed above. A hazard model is estimated to predict the probability of
a consumer purchasing a brand after a number of purchases of that product
category. Figure 1.7 displays the survivor function of the hazard model for
brands Kapo and Del Vale. This Figure displays the probability of not knowing
a brand on a certain shopping trip given that the consumer did not experience
the brand before. Thus, the survivor function in the Figure is called a brand’s
ignorance function. Kapo is the brand with lowest market share and Del Vale
with the highest market share in the data. The ignorance functions show that
the measurement problem is worse for Del Vale than for Kapo. That makes
sense given that Del Vale is the leader of the market of ready-to-drink orange
juice in Brazil, thus consumers are more likely to have purchased this brand
before the beginning of the sample than brands with smaller shares. This
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analysis implies that measurement error is expected to be larger for brands
with larger shares than to smaller competitors.
1.6 Implications and Extensions
This discuss presents implications of modeling demand of experience goods.
The results show that in the case of packaged orange juice, firms would
have to give away their product for free to compensate uninformed consumers
for their experience costs. This suggests that free samples are useful for these
types of goods.
Furthermore, container sizes can be used strategically by firms. The esti-
mated marginal effects of experience for each module-brand imply lower ex-
perience costs for smaller modules (200 and 300 ml containers). This result is
intuitive because if one is going to try a new orange juice, she might rather
buy the smallest possible package. After all, there is a chance she might not
like it. Thus entrants and fringe competitors should also offer their products
in small packages to reduce the cost of experimentation. Some of the smaller
competitors do offer smaller sizes, but not all of them.
Advertising is also different for experience goods. The decision of mar-
keters about what to advertise about a product depends on what kind of
product it is. If the product is an experience good, then it is difficult to in-
form the consumer about his own valuation of the brand, as it is difficult to
describe taste. This type of advertisement is different from advertisements
for electronic products. Computers, for instance, are not experience goods.
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Computer advertisements, in general, describe their characteristics (amount
of memory, size of hard drive, type of processor, screen size, etc). Informa-
tion about these characteristics is normally enough for the individual to rank
different computer types and brands, and then make a decision about what
to buy. Firms have means of transmitting this kind of information. However,
for something like soda or orange juice, advertisements can give a little bit of
information (e.g. sugar content, calories, etc), but cannot really say anything
about taste. Thus, what one observes are advertisements that try to trans-
mit a nice feeling to the consumer in order to try to attract attention to that
product.31
One possible extension of the model presented in this paper is to include
outside options. A consumer’s decision to buy something else other than or-
ange juice is not being considered. For instance, another fruit juice that might
be a substitute for orange juice. One problem of not modeling this is that if
all brands increase their prices by say 20%, nothing happens to the probabil-
ities of consumers buying each brand. This result is due to the fact that, in
multinomial logit models, only relative changes in variables matter. However,
price for the outside option could be normalized to 0, and therefore changes
in relative prices could be introduced, even if an increase of 20% in prices is
observed for all module-brands of orange juice.32 In that situation, the outside
31There is a large literature that discusses distinctions between different types of adver-
tisements, for example Stigler (1961), Butters (1977), and Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
Ackerberg (2001) and Ackerberg (2003) empirically distinguish the effect of influential ad-
vertisement and of informational advertisement for a brand of yogurt. Ackerberg (2001)
mentions a television advertisement for ”Molson Ice” beer that portrayed twenty-somethings
dressed in hip clothes in a bar drinking the beer. Clearly such advertisements should stim-
ulate demand for the product, otherwise Molson would not pay for them. However it is also
clear that they do not provide any information about the characteristics of the good.
32The outside option is included in a multinomial model as an additional alternative. One
can normalize the value of all product characteristics to zero. It is common to allow for the
utility of the outside good to vary only with socio-demographic characteristics.
32
good would steal market share from every brand in the market. While appeal-
ing, the problem is that it is not clear what the outside option should be. One
could define it as every other purchase of fruit juice of the consumer or as every
visit that the consumer makes to the grocery store and does not buy orange
juice, among other options. It is easier to define the outside option when the
researcher is working with aggregate data instead of consumer-level data. In
that case he needs only to assume something about the consumption pattern
of the average consumer for that product category. Nevo (2000) presents an
example for the industry of ready-to-eat cereals.
Another extension would be to add random coefficients into the model.
This would allow for a more realistic pattern of substitution among brands,
therefore addressing the problem generated by the problem of independence
of irrelevant alternatives. When this property holds, a change in price of an
alternative generates a proportional change in the probability of choosing all
the other alternatives. It would be more realistic to predict that consumers will
switch mostly to the alternative that is most similar to the one that changed
its price.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper argues that introducing prior experience and shopping frequency is
important to model consumers’ demand for experience goods. By estimating
the extended model for packaged orange juice using consumer-level scanner
data, the results show that experience costs are significant and large for this
type of product, even when controlling for brand loyalty.
33
The paper contributes to a large body of literature of demand estimation
of differentiated goods, both in industrial organization and in marketing, by
introducing the main features of experience goods markets in a tractable way.
The results offer important insights for academic research, policy research and
for the private sector.
The estimated marginal effects of price and experience imply that firms
would need to give away their products for free to compensate uninformed
consumers for their experience cost. Moreover, the results show that frequent
shoppers are on average more loyal to brands. Furthermore, implied price elas-
ticities change significantly when experience, brand loyalty and frequency are
included. For instance, informed consumers display lower own-price elasticity
than uninformed ones. Without taking prior experience and loyalty into ac-
count, consumers seem to be more willing to substitute among brands. Thus,
modifications of the model should be taken into account if one estimates de-
mand for experience goods.
The fact that consumers face large experience cost also implies that the
landscape for entrants is particularly daunting in markets of experience goods.
This fact together with the changes in implied elasticities are important for
antitrust analysis of this type of market. According to the results of the model
large incumbents will have even more market power than in a standard good’s
market in which consumers have perfect information about different brands.
The consumers’ experience problem makes life harder for entrants or firms
with small market shares.
34
1.A Chapter 1 - Appendix
Figure 1.1: Number of brands purchased over the sample
35
Figure 1.2: Distribution of median duration between consumers’ shopping trips
Figure 1.3: Distribution of median duration between shopping trips on which
orange juice was purchased
36
Figure 1.4: Number of new brands experimented by consumers
37
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Figure 1.6: Range of the first-time experience variable by the number of shop-
ping trips averaged across brands and consumers.
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Figure 1.7: Survivor function for the experience variable for the leader and
the smallest brand in the market.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Prices per 1L Average Std. Dev.
Orange Juice
Bela Vista 1L 3.405 0.281
Bela Vista 200 ml 5.698 1.613
Xando 1L 3.035 0.23
Xando 300 ml 4.223 0.713
Kapo 200 ml 3.642 0.343
Orange Nectar
Del Vale 1L 2.668 0.251
Leco 1L 3.413 0.396
Leco 1L light 3.704 0.509
Maguary 1L 2.487 0.3
Maguary 1L light 3.047 0.389
Maguary 200 ml 5.023 0.899
Sufresh 1L 2.375 0.233
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Table 1.2: Estimated Coefficients - Models with Alternative Specific Constants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.279*** -0.257*** -0.210*** -0.211*** -0.184*** -0.407***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.071)
Experience -3.325*** -1.909*** -2.077*** -1.402*** -1.833***
(0.052) (0.064) (0.099) (0.262) (0.302)
Loyalty GL 2.410*** 2.403*** 2.400*** 1.526***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.274)
Price × Experience -0.215*** -0.042
(0.078) (0.089)
Price × Loyalty GL 0.327***
(0.077)
Median Duration × ...
... Experience 0.030** 0.030** 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
... Loyalty GL -0.034*
(0.020)
... Bela Vista 200 ml 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.107***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
... Coca Cola 200 ml 0.054** 0.052** 0.059**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
... Del Valle 1L 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.060***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
... Leco 1L 0.017 0.017 0.022
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
... Leco 1L light -0.014 -0.016 -0.007
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
... Maguary 1L 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
... Maguary 1L light 0.001 -0.001 0.009
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
... Maguary 200 ml 0.074** 0.076** 0.076**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
... Sufresh 1L 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.066***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
... Xando 1L 0.029 0.028 0.033*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
... Xando 300 ml -0.022 -0.023 -0.016
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Alternative Specific Effects X X X X X X
Observations 5,213 5,213 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.3: Estimated Coefficients - Models with Module-Brand Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.305*** -0.292*** -0.238*** -0.221*** -0.205*** -0.316***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.040) (0.065)
Experience -3.422*** -1.941*** -2.061*** -1.618*** -1.788***
(0.054) (0.065) (0.099) (0.252) (0.289)
Loyalty GL 2.522*** 2.443*** 2.440*** 2.099***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.260)
Price × Experience -0.144* -0.051
(0.076) (0.087)
Price × Loyalty 0.165**
(0.072)
Experience × Median Dura-
tion
0.028** 0.029** 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Loyalty × Median Duration -0.037*
(0.019)
Mililiters 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Light -0.563*** 0.111 -0.213** 0.121 0.143 0.119
(0.074) (0.082) (0.083) (0.160) (0.161) (0.162)
Nectar -1.141*** -1.005*** -0.812*** -0.774*** -0.779*** -0.771***
(0.046) (0.053) (0.061) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107)
Sugar -0.523*** -0.174*** 0.105* -0.142 -0.149 -0.167
(0.039) (0.052) (0.062) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Median Duration × Alter-
native Dummies
X X X
Observations 5,213 5,213 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative characteristics.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
42
T
ab
le
1.
4:
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
ts
of
P
ri
ce
an
d
E
la
st
ic
it
ie
s
fr
om
th
e
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
D
em
an
d
M
o
d
el
A
lt
e
r
n
a
t
iv
e
M
a
r
g
in
a
l
E
f
f
e
c
t
E
l
a
st
ic
it
ie
s
C
r
o
ss
E
l
a
s-
t
ic
it
ie
s
B
el
a
V
is
ta
1
L
-0
.0
2
3
4
7
7
4
-0
.9
5
2
1
4
5
3
0
.0
8
7
2
5
9
4
B
el
a
V
is
ta
2
0
0
m
l
-0
.0
1
2
2
7
6
1
-1
.6
5
9
8
6
8
0
.0
7
2
7
2
3
8
C
o
ca
l
C
o
la
2
0
0
m
l
-0
.0
2
2
0
2
7
4
-1
.0
2
2
4
8
2
0
.0
8
6
8
4
0
2
D
el
V
a
ll
e
1
L
-0
.0
2
8
7
3
8
4
-0
.7
2
8
1
2
3
1
0
.0
8
5
6
0
8
6
L
ec
o
1
L
-0
.0
2
3
4
1
4
1
-0
.9
5
5
1
2
3
4
0
.0
8
7
2
4
9
3
L
ec
o
1
L
li
g
h
t
-0
.0
2
1
5
0
4
7
-1
.0
4
8
9
4
1
0
.0
8
6
5
9
2
3
M
a
g
u
a
ry
1
L
-0
.0
3
0
1
6
1
3
-0
.6
7
4
4
0
1
7
0
.0
8
4
3
3
5
7
M
a
g
u
a
ry
1
L
li
g
h
t
-0
.0
2
5
8
9
3
1
-0
.8
4
3
7
9
8
8
0
.0
8
7
1
0
7
2
M
a
g
u
a
ry
2
0
0
m
l
-0
.0
1
4
7
9
6
1
-1
.4
5
7
8
6
7
0
.0
7
8
4
6
9
2
S
u
fr
es
h
1
L
-0
.0
3
1
0
5
5
3
-0
.6
4
1
9
0
2
6
0
.0
8
3
3
5
9
1
X
a
n
d
1
L
-0
.0
2
6
0
0
6
9
-0
.8
3
8
9
3
9
3
0
.0
8
7
0
7
4
3
X
a
n
d
o
3
0
0
m
l
-0
.0
1
8
7
8
1
6
-1
.1
9
7
6
8
2
0
.0
8
4
4
3
9
6
T
h
is
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
m
a
rg
in
a
l
e
ff
e
c
ts
fo
r
p
ri
c
e
s,
o
w
n
-p
ri
c
e
e
la
st
ic
it
ie
s
a
n
d
c
ro
ss
-p
ri
c
e
e
la
st
ic
it
ie
s.
T
h
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
re
e
v
a
lu
a
te
d
a
t
th
e
m
e
a
n
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
.
T
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
w
a
s
e
st
im
a
te
d
w
it
h
a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s.
43
Table 1.5: Different Loyalty Specifications - Models with Alternative Specific
Constants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.218*** -0.273*** -0.210*** -0.395*** -0.245*** -0.407***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.064) (0.050) (0.071)
Experience -2.412*** -2.867*** -1.909*** -2.169*** -2.464*** -1.833***
(0.059) (0.056) (0.064) (0.294) (0.264) (0.302)
Loyalty 1 1.383*** 0.683***
(0.041) (0.201)
Loyalty 2 0.064*** 0.008
(0.003) (0.008)
Loyalty GL 2.410*** 1.526***
(0.063) (0.274)
Price × Experience -0.083 -0.211*** -0.042
(0.088) (0.079) (0.089)
Price × Loyalty 1 0.285***
(0.059)
Price × Loyalty 2 0.000
(0.002)
Price × Loyalty GL 0.327***
(0.077)
Median Duration × ...
... Experience 0.003 0.069*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
... Loyalty 1 -0.040***
(0.012)
... Loyalty 2 0.016***
(0.001)
... Loyalty GL -0.034*
(0.020)
Median Duration × Alter-
native Dummies
X X X
Alternative Specific Effects X X X X X X
Observations 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Different Loyalty Specifications - Models with Alternative Charac-
teristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.251*** -0.249*** -0.238*** -0.339*** -0.193*** -0.316***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.058) (0.045) (0.065)
Experience -2.467*** -2.956*** -1.941*** -2.205*** -2.548*** -1.788***
(0.060) (0.057) (0.065) (0.282) (0.254) (0.289)
Loyalty 1 1.443*** 1.027***
(0.042) (0.191)
Loyalty 2 0.066*** 0.015*
(0.003) (0.008)
Loyalty GL 2.522*** 2.099***
(0.064) (0.260)
Price × Experience -0.070 -0.191** -0.051
(0.086) (0.077) (0.087)
Price × Loyalty 1 0.186***
(0.055)
Price × Loyalty 2 -0.003*
(0.002)
Price × Loyalty GL 0.165**
(0.072)
Median Duration × ...
... Experience 0.000 0.070*** 0.005
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
... Loyalty 1 -0.042***
(0.012)
... Loyalty 2 0.017***
(0.001)
... Loyalty GL -0.037*
(0.019)
Mililiter 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Light -0.074 -0.007 -0.213** 0.242 0.377** 0.119
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.162) (0.160) (0.162)
Nectar -0.908*** -0.810*** -0.812*** -0.879*** -0.742*** -0.771***
(0.060) (0.056) (0.061) (0.105) (0.101) (0.107)
Sugar -0.010 0.124** 0.105* -0.312*** -0.152 -0.167
(0.059) (0.057) (0.062) (0.102) (0.099) (0.107)
Median Duration × Alter-
native Dummies
X X X
Observations 5028 5028 5028 5028 5028 5028
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative characteristics.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Income Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Low Income High Income
Price -0.407*** -0.384*** -0.453*** -0.445*** -0.380***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.095) (0.102) (0.099)
Experience -1.833*** -1.859*** -1.862*** -1.935*** -1.876***
(0.302) (0.303) (0.305) (0.442) (0.420)
Price × Income between 25th
and 75th percentile
-0.053
(0.117)
Price × Income above 75th
percentile
0.234**
(0.111)
Loyalty 1.526*** 1.569*** 1.538*** 1.636*** 1.133***
(0.274) (0.276) (0.280) (0.393) (0.391)
Price × Experience -0.042 -0.027 -0.044 -0.032 -0.053
(0.089) (0.090) (0.097) (0.134) (0.122)
Price × Experience × Income
between 25th and 75th per-
centile
0.028
(0.052)
Price × Experience × Income
above 75th percentile
0.016
(0.053)
Price × Loyalty 0.327*** 0.306*** 0.313*** 0.282** 0.405***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.084) (0.114) (0.106)
Price × Loyalty × Income be-
tween 25th and 75th percentile
0.012
(0.049)
Price × Loyalty × Income
above 75th percentile
-0.009
(0.049)
Median Duration × Experience 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.025)
Median Duration × Loyalty -0.034* -0.032 -0.030 -0.038 -0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029)
Income X X
MedianDuration X X X X X
Alternative Specific Effects X X X X X
Observations 5028 5028 5028 2114 2914
Log Likelihood -5582 -5477 -5473 -2557 -2961
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Umbrella
Branding on Consumers’
First-Time Experience and
Brand Choice
2.1 Introduction
Multiproduct firms often market their products under the same brand name.
This strategy is known as umbrella branding. When a firm launches a new
product with the same brand name, consumers can pool their prior experience
with the brand to infer quality for the new products. This strategy can be
particularly useful when a firm decides to enter a market of experience goods,
in which consumers face a cost for trying a new product. In that way, the
company can capitalize on its brand name through the brand extension strat-
egy.
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The main objective of this paper is to study the process by which con-
sumers’ brand choices and first-time purchases in a particular category are
affected by their experience with the same brand in another category. The-
oretical models (e.g. Wernerfelt (1988), Amrouche, Rhouma, and Zaccour
(2009), Cabral (2009), Cai and Obara (2009), Hakenes and Peitz (2008), Moor-
thy (2010)) show that experience with another product under the same brand
provides consumers with information about the product that they have never
tried before. Therefore, umbrella branding strategy, at least theoretically, re-
duces experience costs for brand users, which reduces entry cost for established
brands.
Empirical work has provided evidence of spillover effects among products
of the same brand (e.g. Balachander and Ghose (2003), Chen and Liu (2004),
Erdem (1998), Erdem and Chang (2012)). The paper closest to the work pre-
sented in this chapter is Erdem (1998), which studies the process by which
consumers’ quality perceptions for a brand in a particular category are af-
fected by their purchases in another category. In particular, Erdem focuses
on learning through repeated purchases of toothpaste and toothbrushes and
argues that consumers update their quality perception of each product as they
can only fully learn about the effects of the product after many purchases.1
The empirical research reported in this chapter differs in two dimensions: (1)
it separately identifies the effect of umbrella branding on first-time experience
with a brand’s product from its effect on repeated purchases, and (2) it uses
the purchase history of all products under the same brand name to evaluate
the effect of umbrella branding in a particular category of that brand. The
effect on consumers’ first-time experience cost is important from a firm’s point
1For example, the teeth-whitening power of a toothpaste, which is supposed to be ob-
servable after several uses of the toothpaste.
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of view as it affects the cost of introducing a new product in the market, in
which case all consumers would be first-time buyers.
This chapter presents a discrete choice model of demand with first-time
experience and brand loyalty, estimated on scanner panel data provided by a
large supermarket chain in Brazil. Demand is estimated for seven brands of
ready-to-drink juices produced by different firms that offer (1) different juices
and/or (2) different products with the same brand name. Using consumer
panel data makes it possible to follow each consumer’s purchase history and
investigate how prior brand experience affects shopping decision.
The results are consistent with signaling theories of umbrella branding as
they indicate that consumers’ experience cost with a product decreases with
experience of other products of the same brand. In particular, consumers that
have no prior experience with a brand face an experience cost that is 37%
higher for ready-to-drink orange juices than consumers having had prior ex-
perience with the brand. Moreover, a brand’s user has a larger probability of
repurchasing an orange juice of the same brand. This increase in probability
is even larger fro those consumers having had previous experience within the
same product line. However, the reduction in experience cost for this later
group remains unchanged, suggesting that prior experience with the brand,
not the product line, is important for first-time experience cost.
The finding that prior experience with a brand product of the same cat-
egory has a larger impact on the purchase probability, relative to experience
with a different category, is consistent with studies showing that “fit” between
products is an important factor for the effectiveness of an umbrella branding
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strategy (Keller (2008)). However the finding that the reduction of experience
costs does not depend on the product category consumers experienced before
has not been suggested and studied before. This indicates that the fit between
products might be relevant for the effect of umbrella branding strategy on re-
purchase decisions but not for first-time buying.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature and Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the data.
Results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
The problem of imperfect information for consumer choice has been widely
explored in the theoretical work. The source of imperfect information and the
mechanism for acquiring it define the problem consumers face. Consumers
may know everything there is to know about a product, but might not be in-
formed about its price and have to travel to stores to learn about it, incurring
some search cost (Diamond 1971, Rothschild 1974, Rosenfield and Shapiro
1981). Moreover, they may not know how much they like the product, and
have to bear search costs to learn about their own valuation for it (Kohn and
Shavell 1974, Wolinsky 1983, 1984). If the least costly mechanism to inspect
the product is purchase, then consumers face an experience problem (Nelson
1970). In that case, the experience cost is the utility foregone for the best
brand known to the consumer. Thus, consumers risk buying a brand that
does not match their tastes as well as other brands they already know (Mont-
gomery and Wernerfelt, 1992).
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Wernerfelt (1988) analyzes how firms can influence the consumers’ decision
using their brand name. He presents a signaling model in which a multiproduct
firm can use its reputation, which it credibly established in a market through
its brand name, to signal the valuation of a newly introduced experience good.
This strategy is known in the literature as umbrella branding. In Wernerfelt’s
model, it works because consumers apply their perceived quality across prod-
ucts of the same brand. His results show that firms will use their reputation
as a signaling device in this setting as consumers face reduced uncertainty and
risk when trying a new product of the same firm. Other theoretical papers
have explored conditions defining an optimal umbrella branding strategy since
there are costs and benefits for adopting it (Amrouche, Rhouma, and Zaccour
2009, Cabral 2009, Cai and Obara 2009, Hakenes and Peitz 2008, Moorthy
2010). For example, firms can save on advertising costs by marketing a brand,
shared by two products, instead of two products individually. Additionally,
Schmalensee (1978) shows that umbrella branding can be used to crowd the
product space and deter entry. However, umbrella branding may also have
a cost since a product’s failure can affect the reputation of the brand, hav-
ing a negative impact on the sales of all other products under that brand name.
Empirical evidence on the existence of umbrella branding in consumer
choice problems is mainly based on experiments. Studies examining the ef-
fectiveness of umbrella branding in a laboratory setting trace back to Aaker
and Keller (1990). Their findings suggest that consumers ex ante assessment
of a newly introduced product increases as (a) the perceived fit2 between new
product and the brand increases and (b) the brand’s reputation among con-
2“Fit” is used in the literature as the adherence of one product to the firm’s core business,
or perceived core. If fit matters, the firm may be empowered by launching a product close
to the core for which it is known to be an expert.
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sumers increase.
Several researchers extend their finding across different dimensions by con-
ducting experiments (Bousch and Loken 1991, Dacin and Smith 1994, Park,
Milberg, and Lawson 1991, Rangaswamy, Burke, and Oliver 1993, Reddy, Ho-
lak, and Bhat 1994). Erdem (1998) is the first to use revealed preference data
and a consumer learning model to investigate the impact of umbrella brand-
ing on consumers’ brand choices. She estimates her model using scanner data
for the U.S., focusing on two products (toothpaste and toothbrushes) where
a subset of products share the same brand name across these two categories.
Erdem’s results indicate the existence of umbrella branding effects, as she finds
that the quality levels of umbrella branded products to be high. Thus, con-
sumer quality perceptions of products with the same brand name in these two
categories are affected by the experience in either one of the categories. Er-
dem and Chang (2012) explore the effect of umbrella branding for store brands
and find that it works in the same way as for national umbrella brands. Bal-
achander and Ghose (2003) investigate the existence of spillover effects due
to the advertising of brands. Using data on yogurt and detergent advertise-
ments, they show that advertising a new product of a brand also increases the
probability of buying existing products under the same brand name. Sullivan
(1990), on the other hand, finds evidence for a negative spillover effect. She
studies whether the introduction of a new Jaguar model affects the demand of
used Jaguar models. Her results indicate that the introduction of a new model
stimulates demand for used Jaguars, but advertising the new model reduces
demand for used Jaguar models. This suggests the existence of a negative
spillover effect.
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2.3 Model
A multinomial logit model with first-time experience and brand loyalty is es-
timated to study the impact of umbrella branding on consumers’ brand choice
of ready-to-drink orange juice.
There are J alternatives available for the i− th consumer. The consumer
selects alternative j that gives her the highest indirect utility, Uij. The indirect
utility can be decomposed into observable and unobservable parts. For each
alternative j ∈ J in the shopping trip t, the indirect utility of individual i can
be written as
Uij = ξj + αPijt + βk
K∑
k=1
Xjkt + ijt (2.1)
where ξj is an alternative-specific constant; Pijt is the price offered to consumer
i for alternative j at purchase occasion t; Xjkt is a vector of alternative-specific
characteristics of alternative j at occasion t; and ijt is the random component
for consumer i, alternative j and time t. The alternative-specific constant
captures the average effect on utility of all factors that are not included in the
model (e.g. intrinsic quality).
2.3.1 First-time experience, loyalty and umbrella brand-
ing
Prior experience is introduced into the model in order to capture the expe-
rience cost incurred due to lack of information about brands in the market.
Brand loyalty is included to capture habit formation.
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First-time experience enters the consumer’s utility function as a dummy
variable which is equal to one if she has never purchased the brand and is
equal to zero if she has purchased that brand before. The variable is coded in
this way so that its estimated coefficient reflects the experience cost of trying
a new brand.
Exijt =

1 if brand of j has not been purchased by consumer i yet,
0 otherwise.
The brand loyalty variable is computed from consumers’ purchase history
as an exponentially smoothed weighted average of lagged purchase indicators
as suggested by Guadagni and Little (1983),. Brand loyalty GLijt for consumer
i toward brand of alternative j at purchase occasion t is given by
GLijt = δGLijt−1 + (1− δ)dijt−1
where dijt−l1 is an indicator function equal to one if the consumer purchased
brand j at t− 1, and zero otherwise.
The umbrella branding variable is defined in two ways. First, it is specified
as a dummy that indicates if consumer i has ever purchased some other product
with the same brand name as brand j
UBijt =

1 if any other product with the same brand name as j
has been purchased by consumer i at any time before t,
0 otherwise.
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Second, it is defined as a stock of exposure with other products with the
same brand name as j,
UBijt = δUBijt−1 + (1− δ)bijt−1
where bijt−1 is an indicator function that equals one if consumer i purchased
some other product of brand j at t − 1, and zero otherwise. This variable
is discounted over time. Its value diminishes as time since last purchase in-
creases. The parameter δ is set equal to 0.5.
Equation 2.2 represents the utility of consumer i for alternative j at pur-
chase occasion t. The main coefficients of interest are κ and ϕ as they capture
the effect of umbrella branding. Coefficient ϕ captures the effect of umbrella
branding on consumers’ choice through first-time experience. Signaling mod-
els of umbrella branding posit that exposure to the same brand name in other
categories reduces consumers’ experience cost. Coefficient ϕ > 0 would be
consistent with this hypothesis.
Uij = ξj + αPijt + δExijt + λBLijt + κUBijt + ϕExijt × UBijt + ijt (2.2)
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2.4 Data
The model is estimated on consumer-level panel data supplied by a large su-
permarket chain in Brazil.3 The dataset consists of purchase information of
fidelity card members who scan their card when they pay for their purchases.
The panel covers all shopping trips of consumers from January 2005 to De-
cember 2006, recorded in any store of the retailer.
The analysis includes seven national brands that sell ready-to-drink orange
juice: Del Valle, Maguary, Kapo, Sufresh, Leco, Fazenda Xando and Fazenda
Bela Vista. The first four brand names were first introduced in the Brazilian
market as brands of fruit juices. The remaining three were brands of other
foods, mostly dairy products, and their fruit juices were introduced in the
market after the brand name was widely known.
Some manufacturers use their own corporate name as their brand (Fazenda
Bela Vista, Fazenda Xando and Del Valle). Fazenda Bela Vista was
founded in 1960 selling milk; only at the end of the 1980s did it expand to
yogurt under the same brand name and subsequently to other dairy products.
In 1998 it introduced its ready-to-drink orange juice. The Fazenda Xando
brand is also mainly known for its milk products. Del Valle is a fruit juice
brand that until 2007 was owned by the Mexican company Jugos Del Valle.
It entered the Brazilian market in 1997 and was the market leader during the
time of analysis (2005 and 2006).
Leco is a well known national brand in Brazil owned by Group Vigor.
Similar to the aforementioned brand names, Leco is mainly used for dairy
3The name of the retailer is not reported for confidentiality reasons.
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products. However, compared to the other brands in the analysis, it is the one
that spreads over the largest number of products. Consumers in the sample
buy products with the Leco brand name from at least nine categories other
than fruit juices (e.g different types of yogurts, butter, margarine, milk-based
beverages and cooking fat).
Kapo is a brand name owned by the Coca-Cola Company, and until 2007
it was only used for fruit juices. Similarly, WOW, a company that tradition-
ally focused on non-alcoholic beverages, reserves the brand Sufresh only for
its fruit juices alone and has done so since 2003. Finally, Maguary is a brand
name belonging to Kraft Foods during the sample period. It was first known
by its condensed fruit juices and frozen juice pulp, and later entered the mar-
ket of ready-to-drink fruit juices.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of knowledge of a brand
due to prior consumption of its products on the decision to buy a product un-
der that brand name in one particular category, ready-to-drink orange juice.
For that only consumers that bought ready-to-drink orange juice at least ten
times are included in the sample. Furthermore, only consumers of the state of
Sa˜o Paulo are considered to minimize issues of product availability. Availabil-
ity is a common problem for empirical papers of consumer choice estimated
on consumer-level data. In most cases, there is no information on what al-
ternatives were available to the decision maker at the time of purchase. The
assumption here is that every alternative is always available. Restricting the
shopping area helps minimize problems that might emanate from this assump-
tion. Two hundred and nineteen consumers meet the sample selection criteria,
for whom 5,455 shopping trips in which ready-to-drink orange juice was pur-
60
chased are recorded. This represents roughly 20% of the total number of visits
to the grocery store recorded by these consumers.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Umbrella Branding, First- and Repeat Purchases
In 59% of occasions when consumers purchased a new brand of orange juice,
they had already experienced that brand due to one or more previous pur-
chases of another product under the same umbrella brand name. Table 2.1
shows that this also differs across brands and suggests that there is enough
variation in the sample in consumers’ history with a brand at the time of their
first purchase of its ready-to-drink orange juice.
Table 2.2 presents results from multinomial logit regressions. The first
column displays results from a benchmark model, including price, first-time
experience and brand loyalty, for the demand of brands of ready-to-drink or-
ange juice. The experience variable takes on the value of one for alternative j
if the consumer has never bought a ready-to-drink orange juice of that brand
before, or zero otherwise. This variable separates the consumers into informed
and uninformed consumer groups. The brand loyalty variable, specified as in
Guadagni and Little (1983), summarizes the consumer’s history with a brand
and discounts it over time. The price coefficient is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, implying negative own-price elasticities of consumers’ demand. The
positive and statistically significant effect of brand loyalty shows that con-
sumers are loyal to previous brand choices. The negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on the experience dummy indicates a first-time experience
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cost even when controlling for brand loyalty.4 Moreover, first-time experience
is quite costly when relating it to a consumer’s willingness to pay. Specifically,
willingness to pay for a known, or experienced, brand can be calculated by
dividing the coefficient of first-time experience by the price sensibility param-
eter.5 This implies that consumers are willing to pay R$ 9.10 for a brand they
already know.6 This value is also sizeable since the average price for a one
liter package of ready-to-drink orange juice in the sample is R$ 3.56. Thus,
first-time experience cost for this product is almost three times its average
price.
As discussed in Section 2.2, umbrella branding strategies are particularly
important in markets of experience goods as brand extension can reduce con-
sumers’ experience cost. To examine whether prior experience with the same
brand affects the probability of buying that brand’s ready-to-drink orange
juice, an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if a consumer bought
another product of the same brand before or zero otherwise, is introduced in
column 2 of Table 2.2. Therefore, this variable captures prior knowledge of a
brand due to a prior purchase of any other product than ready-to-drink orange
juice of that brand. Results in column 2 indicate that prior purchase of any
other product of the same brand increases the probability of purchasing the
orange juice of that brand. Economic magnitudes can be determined by esti-
mating average marginal effects of this variable on the purchase probability.
4Note that this indicator variable takes on the value of one if consumers never experienced
the brand before and thus can be interpreted as an experience cost.
5This is derived as follows: take the total derivative of Equation 2.2, holding constant
all other variables except price and experience and setting it to zero to ensure constant
utility: dU = αP + δEx. The marginal rate of substitution can be calculated by solving for
the change in price that would maintain utility constant when switching on the experience
variable. dPdEx = − δα .
6This magnitude (R$9.10) is determined by dividing the coefficients of experience (-1.909)
by the coefficient on price (-0.210).
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This computation indicates that the purchase probability across alternatives
increases on average by 3% if a consumer has bought a product of the same
brand before.
To examine whether prior experience with a brand has differential effects
on the probability of buying a brand for the first time or again, the indicator
variable is interacted with the experience dummy in column 3. As found be-
fore, prior shopping of a brand increases the likelihood of repurchasing that
brand as shown in the positive and significant coefficient of 2.356. Moreover,
the prior experience of a different product of the same brand also reduces
the experience cost associated with buying an unknown orange juice. Similar
to before the economic magnitude of this reduction in experience costs can
be computed by dividing the coefficient on the interaction of experience of
orange juice and experience of any other product of the same brand (0.881)
by the coefficient on experience with orange juice (-2,348). This implies that
the first-time experience cost decreases by 37%. First-time experience costs
is almost three times the average product price (see above). Thus, this re-
sult indicates that the experience cost associated with consuming an unknown
ready-to-drink orange juice reduces to twice the average price of orange juice
if the consumer also bought another product of the same brand before and
umbrella branding reduces first-time experience cost. This might also explain
why incumbents of the food industry mostly entered this market at the end of
the 1990s in Brazil using existing brand names.
Aaker and Keller (1990) argues that umbrella branding is more effective
if consumers previously bought products of the same brand that are “closer”
with respect to certain product attributes. With that in mind, the aforemen-
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tioned indicator variable is modified to restrict the analysis to only items of
the same product line. The new variable takes on the value of one if a con-
sumer bought another flavored ready-to-drink juice of the same brand before,
or zero otherwise. Consequently, this variable is labeled “Bought Same Brand
AND Product Line” in Table 2.2 as other juices of the same brand are closer
to ready-to-drink orange juice than, for instance, butter of the same brand,
and therefore provide more information to the consumer. The objective of this
exercise is to evaluate if “fit” of branded products to the product of interest
matters. Similar to before, results in the fourth column of Table 2.2 indicate
that experience with other flavors of ready-to-drink fruit juices positively affect
the probability of also buying the orange juice of that brand. Compared to the
umbrella branding coefficient in column 2, having already experienced another
juice of a brand, the effect on the probability of buying that brand’s orange
juice is twice as large as the marginal effect of the umbrella brand effect when
all product categories are considered (1.011 (column 4) vs. 0.579 (column 2)).7
The indicator variable under review is interacted with the experience dummy
in column 5 to examine whether the effect of experience costs is similar to
earlier findings. Results suggest that, as before, prior experience of a brand
via the purchase of other flavored ready-to-drink juices significantly reduces
experience costs.
To further investigate the difference between the effect of umbrella brand-
ing through product line and other product categories, column 6 of Table 2.2
presents results with all variables together: (1) an indicator variable that takes
on the value of one if the consumer has already purchased any of the other
7Although the magnitude of these coefficients is different is not possible to test whether
they are statistically different from each other as they are obtained from different regression
models.
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juices of that brand and zero otherwise, (2) a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the consumer previously purchased any product of that
brand (including its juices) and zero otherwise, and (3) interactions of these
two indicator variables with the first-time experience variable. This specifi-
cation examines whether prior experience of the same brand in general or,
more specifically, prior experience of the same brand, and product line ex-
erts a greater impact on the purchase probability of a brand’s orange juice.
Thus, this specification examines whether umbrella branding of similar prod-
ucts exerts a greater impact on the probability to also buy a ready-to-drink
orange juice of the same brand. Results indicate that only previous purchases
of juices have a significant effect on the repurchase probability of a brand’s
orange juice, consistent with the notion that “fit” is important for umbrella
branding. Interestingly, however, the results show that product “fit” is not
important for first-time purchases. The significant coefficient on the interac-
tion between the experience dummy and the “same brand” indicator suggests
that experience costs, associated with first-time purchases, are reduced when
consumers already know the brand, but there is no additional reduction of
experience costs if consumers also experienced other flavored juices before.
Results on column 6 of Table 2.2 show that knowing any product of a brand
reduces the experience cost of buying its orange juice for the first time by 26%.
This is computed by dividing the coefficient on the interaction of experience
and the same brand dummy (0.581) by the coefficient on the experience indi-
cator (2.250). In addition, prior purchases of other juices from the same brand
further reduce experience cost by 16% (0.356 / 2.250), but this effect is only
statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Companies can also own more than one brand. To test whether the expe-
rience of another brand, but owned by the same company affects consumers’
decisions, a variable is included that takes on the value of one when a con-
sumer bought another brand of the same firm, and zero otherwise. Results,
presented in column 7 in Table 2.2, indicate that prior purchases of products
of the same manufacturer, but commercialized under a different brand name,
have no statistically significant effect on the choice of that brand’s orange
juice. This suggests that consumers do not associate different brands owned
by the same corporation. Moreover, this finding sheds light on how firms can
target different segments with very different messages by using different brand
names and the strategy used for one brand does not contaminate consumers’
perception of the other brand, even though they are owned by the same corpo-
ration. The brand loyalty for a brand name also allows one to understand the
reason why a merger of two brands might not result in shifting to one of the
two brand names for fear of losing brand loyalty to the dropped brand name.
2.5.2 Robustness
Continuous Variable of Umbrella Branding
So far, the effect of umbrella branding on first- and repeat purchases was cap-
tured by the inclusion of the aforementioned dummy variables. However, it is
also possible to examine a consumer’s prior experience with a brand contin-
uously following the variable construction of brand loyalty by Guadagni and
Little (1983). In particular, the indicator variables of previous experience with
other products are replaced with a variable of the stock of exposure with the
brand, defined between zero and one, that is discounted over time. On the
one hand, this assumes that prior brand experience has a linear effect on the
purchase probability of a brand’s orange juice. On the other hand, this vari-
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able discounts recent prior experience with a brand less and than more distant
past experience.
Table 2.3 re-estimates the models presented in Table 2.2 where the dummy
variables that capture prior brand experience are replaced with a continuous
variable as described above. While coefficient estimates change, the earlier
discussed results in regards to Table 2.2 still hold and (i) prior experience
with a brand increases the likelihood of buying that brand’s orange juice, but
(ii) only prior experience with another juice of the same brand increases the
probability of buying that brand’s orange juice for the first time.
Censoring
Due to the sample period, consumers are not observed since the first day of
their lives. Thus, it is possible that consumers bought the orange juice or
any other product of a brand before the sample starts. To examine the effect
of this assumption on the repeat and first-time purchases of ready-to-drink
orange juice, the regression models of columns 3,5 and 6 of Tables 2.2 and
2.3 are estimated with different sample sizes. In particular, a consumer’s first
5, 8 or 10 shopping trips are excluded when estimating demand. However,
variables that depend on purchase history are built using the entire sample.
The objective is to see how sensitive results are due to this censoring issue.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 replicate the results reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, re-
spectively, using different sample sizes. While the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients change, results stay qualitatively the same and are robust to these
changes. This mitigates potential concerns due to censoring of the data.
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2.5.3 Differential Effects
The results on Tables 2.6 to 2.8 discussed bellow are estimated dropping the
first eight shopping trips. Because the variables introduced in the following
analyses are counts of days or number of items, they might display a trend in
the beginning of the sample that is only due to censoring, as in the previous
discussion.
Time since last shopping trip
Results so far reflect the importance of umbrella branding, but consumers
could also forget their earlier experience with a brand. Thus, one might won-
der if the time since a consumer’s last experience with a brand matters for
the first-time and repeat purchases of a brand’s ready-to-drink orange juice.
Consumers might forget. Therefore, the number of days since a consumer’s
last experience with a brand is included as an additional control variable in
the regression.
Results are reported in Table 2.6 and suggest that a longer time since a
consumer’s earlier experience with a brand is not statistically associated with
a different repeat purchase of that brand’s orange juice. Similarly, the in-
teraction of that variable with the experience indicator shows that there is
also no statistically significant effect on first-time purchases in all specifica-
tions. However, the aforementioned patterns still remain and experience with
a brand reduces repeat- and first-time experience cost as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.5.1. Therefore, brand experience seems to have a long lasting effect
on consumers’ choices. A previous purchase of a brand’s product reduces the
first-time experience cost of another product of that brand no matter how long
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ago the prior purchase.8
Number of bought brand items in previous period
One could also measure a consumer’s exposure to a brand by counting the num-
ber of brand items consumers bought in a certain period before the shopping
trip. To test this hypothesis, the number of brand items consumers bought
in the previous 4, 8 or 24 weeks before the shopping trips are counted and
included in the regression model. Thus, larger values of this variable might
indicate that a consumer is more exposed to a certain brand which might then
also impact the effectiveness of umbrella branding.
Results in Table 2.7 show that a larger number of brand items increases
the probability of also buying a brand’s orange juice as the significant coef-
ficients on the number of a brand’s item in the last 4 (column 1), 8 (column
3) or 24 (column 5) weeks indicate. While the variable is statistically signif-
icant for all time intervals, the estimated coefficient diminishes in magnitude
as the length of time used to create the variable increases. Furthermore, the
previously introduced dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if a
consumer bought a product of the same brand previously does not significantly
predict the repeat-purchase probability of a brand’s orange juice. However,
Table 2.7 shows that the coefficient on the interaction between number of items
that a consumer has purchased in a period and prior experience with orange
8An anecdotal example from Brazil of the long lasting effect of brands in consumer minds
is the case of Kolynos. Kolynos is the name of an old-time line of oral care products that was
created in the United States in 1908 and acquired by Colgate-Palmolive in 1995. Because
of antitrust concerns at the time of the merger, Colgate-Palmolive was forced to suspend
Kolynos-branded toothpaste in Brazil for a number of years. The brand was suspended in
1997, but until 2002 it was the leader of brand “awareness” in the Brazilian market according
to the market research “Top of Mind” performed every year by Institute Datafolha. This
means that most consumers still thought first of Kolynos when asked to say the name of
a toothpaste five years after the product was taken out of the market. This is quite an
evidence of long-lasting memory.
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juice is statistically insignificant whereas the interaction of experience with the
dummy variable of prior brand purchase is significant. This suggests that the
exposure to a brand, measured by the number of items previously purchased
of that brand, does affect the probability of repurchase but not the probability
of buying orange juice for the first time.
In Table 2.8, the number of brand items in the last 8 or 24 shopping trips
is broken into several discrete intervals to examine potential nonlinear effects
of exposure to a brand and the purchase probability. In particular, a dummy
variable takes on the value one if the consumer bought between 1 and 3, 4
and 9, or more than 10 brand items in the previous 8 or 24 shopping trips.
These indicator variables should pick up the effect on the intensive margin, as
“Bought Same” and the interaction of this variable with experience are still
kept in the model. Like before, results indicate that greater exposure to a
brand is associated with a higher repurchase probability of that brand’s or-
ange juice. In particular, the results show that the larger the number of items
purchased, the larger the effect on repurchase. Furthermore, the time frame
seems to be less important when using discrete variables as the magnitude of
the coefficients varies little when comparing each column. Interestingly, there
is a different and growing significant effect on repurchase if the consumer has
purchased 1 to 3, 4 to 9 or more than 10 items of a brand in the previous 8
or 24 weeks. Like before, the findings indicate that prior exposure to a brand
in general, as reflected by the previously introduced dummy variable (Bought
Same Brand), significantly reduces a consumer’s experience cost. Although
significant only at the 5% significance level, the results also indicate that ex-
perience costs increase when consumers bought between 4 and 9 (more than
10) brand items in the previous 8 (24) weeks. Note that the coefficients are
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still smaller than the coefficient on the interaction between “Same Brand” and
experience, which suggests that the umbrella brand effect might start getting
smaller as the number of items purchased of a brand increases.
2.5.4 The Effect of the Rival Brand
According to the results, experience cost is large and statistically significant
for the market of ready-to-drink orange juice in Brazil, but it can be reduced
by the consumer’s experience with some other product under the same um-
brella brand name. Could this cost also be affected by the experience with
a “similar” brand? In other words, do consumers transfer information from
close competitors? In Table 2.9 an indicator variable is included in the model
for the experience with the Del Valle orange juice to investigate whether ex-
perience with this juice affects the probability of buying some other brand.
Del Valle was chosen for this exercise as it is the leader brand of ready-
to-drink juices in the Brazilian market. It is the brand name that is mostly
identified with this product line in the country. Table 2.9 replicates columns
2 to 7 of Table 2.2 with the addition of the rival dummy. The implied experi-
ence costs remain large and statistically significant. It ranges from R$ 8.29 to
R$13.52. All else equal, experience with Del Valle does not affect significantly
the probability of purchase of the 1L juices of Xando and Leco. However, it
has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of purchas-
ing the juices of Sufresh and Maguary. The estimated coefficients are larger
than one for both juices in their regular version (i.e. not light). Thus, one
can conclude that the latter are closer brands to Del Valle than the other two.
Interestingly, as mentioned previously in this chapter, Sufresh, Maguary and
Del Valle are brands that are associated with fruit juices. Whereas Xando,
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Leco and Bela Vista offer a wider range of products under their brand name,
and are, in particular, associated with dairy products.
The estimated coefficients on the 200 ml and 300 ml juices are smaller than
one but positive and statistically significant for all brands that offer these small
sizes with the exception of Maguary. Del Valle did not offer small containers
during the period of the sample, therefore consumers who would like to buy
them had to choose some other brand. The choice of Del Valle of not offering
smaller sizes could have reduced consumers’ switching cost to other brands.9
2.5.5 Analysis at the level of the product line
Table 2.10 displays results for the model estimated at the level of the product
line. Instead of estimating the demand for each type of orange juice offered
by each brand, now demand is estimated for a brand of ready-to-drink juice of
any flavor and any type. The analysis is performed for the same seven brands
of juice, but the relevant decision of the consumer is to buy any juice of a
brand. This approach alters the specification of the variables in the analysis.
Experience switches from one to zero when a consumer is observed purchasing
any juice of a brand instead of just orange juice. The loyalty variable is also
recalculated to include history of purchases with all juices of the brand. The
umbrella brand dummy takes on the value one only when consumers have pur-
chased something of the brand that is NOT a ready-to-drink juice (e.g butter,
yogurt or milk). Moreover, the price variable is now a price index that com-
bines the observed prices of each juice weighted by the market share of the
type and flavor of the juice for each brand.
9In fact, after it was purchased by Coca-Cola in 2007, the company re-labeled its juice
Kapo, offered only in 200 ml packages, with the name Del Valle. So now the brand is also
sold in a smaller size.
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The estimated first-time experience cost is still statistically significant. Ac-
cording to the estimates of Table 2.10, it ranges from R$6.68 and R$11.55.
Column 3 yields the experience cost of R$ 11.55 for consumers that never
bought any product of the brand but it is only R$2.73 if consumers have pur-
chased something from the brand in some other product category. Thus the
umbrella brand reduces the first-time experience cost by 76% for fruit juices.
The experience cost for a brand’s unexperienced consumers is statistically
higher than the price of the most expensive brand in the market. However,
for experienced consumers it is statistically lower than the average price index
of every brand in the market (R$ 3,45), although is is statistically higher than
the minimum value of the price index (R$ 2.11). Thus the experience cost is
still large and statistically significant for the brand at the product line level,
but it can be significantly reduced using the umbrella branding strategy. The
drop in experience cost is larger at the product line level than at the product
level.
According to columns 4 and 5, experience with another brand that is owned
by the same company remains statistically insignificant in this analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of umbrella branding on a consumer’s first-
time experience cost with a brand of an experience good and on the probability
of the consumer repurchasing it. Results are consistent with models of informa-
tion economics regarding the umbrella branding strategy. The reported results
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show that consumers’ first-time experience cost is significantly smaller when
they previously have purchased some other product under the same brand
name. This can be an important advantage for a firm with an established
brand that wants to enter an experience good market. The umbrella branding
strategy would reduce its entry cost.
Brand users in other product categories also have a higher probability of
repurchasing the product. The increase in probability is even larger when con-
sidering history of purchases only within the same product line. This is con-
sistent with the idea that the success of a brand extension strategy depends on
the “fit” between products (Keller (2008)). But the effect of umbrella branding
on first-time experience cost remains unchanged despite the product category.
The findings of this paper have important implications for firms that com-
pete in markets of experience goods. When a firm launches a new product
with an existing brand name, consumers can pool their prior experience with
the brand to infer a quality for the products. Because consumers may face
substantial first-time experience costs, like in the ready-to-drink orange juice
example explored in this paper, a firm’s entry costs can be reduced significantly
by using an umbrella branding strategy.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Tables
Table 2.1: Experience with products of the same brand.
Panel A: Panel B:
Consumer knows juice of same
brand ... at time of first pur-
chase
Consumer knows brand ... at
time of first purchase
Brand no yes no yes
Bela Vista 112 0 81 31
Kapo 16 38 16 38
Del Valle 26 79 13 92
Leco 46 9 17 38
Maguary 33 89 20 102
Sufresh 25 45 22 48
Xando 111 0 103 8
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Table 2.8: Exposure to a brand.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.205** -0.206** -0.204** -0.205**
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Experience -2.773*** -2.769*** -2.756*** -2.750***
(0.160) (0.159) (0.160) (0.161)
Loyalty GL 2.335*** 2.333*** 2.339*** 2.337***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
Bought Same Brand -0.030 -0.044 -0.112 -0.128
(0.115) (0.117) (0.138) (0.140)
Experience × Same Brand 1.065*** 1.132*** 1.078*** 1.162***
(0.198) (0.220) (0.199) (0.229)
=1 if 1-3 Brand Items in 8 weeks 0.374*** 0.361***
(0.092) (0.103)
=1 if 4-9 Brand Items in 8 weeks 0.510*** 0.586***
(0.123) (0.140)
=1 10 or more Brand Items in 8 weeks 0.620*** 0.650***
(0.169) (0.192)
Experience × =1 if 1-3 Brand Items in 8 weeks 0.090
(0.227)
Experience × =1 if 4-9 Brand Items in 8 weeks -0.759**
(0.365)
Experience × =1 if 10 or more Brand Items in 8 weeks -0.232
(0.482)
=1 if 1-3 Brand Items in 24 weeks 0.249** 0.224*
(0.116) (0.123)
=1 if 4-9 Brand Items in 24 weeks 0.495*** 0.516***
(0.133) (0.143)
=1 if 10 or more Brand Items in 24 weeks- 0.654*** 0.732***
(0.137) (0.158)
Experience × =1 if 1-3 Brand Items in 24 0.116
(0.226)
Experience × =1 if 4-9 Brand Items in 24 -0.055
(0.322)
Experience × =1 if 10 or more Brand Items in 24 weeks -0.692**
(0.352)
Alternative Fixed Effects X X X X
Number of Consumers 219 219 219 219
Number of Shopping Trips 3,730 3,730 3,730 3,730
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the consumer level and reported in parentheses. First 8 shopping trips of each consumer were dropped.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.9: The effect of experience with the leader.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.201*** -0.203*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.202***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Experience -2.107*** -2.745*** -2.060*** -2.651*** -2.296*** -2.111***
(0.088) (0.153) (0.088) (0.154) (0.117) (0.089)
Loyalty GL 2.384*** 2.370*** 2.368*** 2.349*** 2.357*** 2.381***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070)
Bought Same Brand 0.361*** 0.168* 0.027 0.363***
(0.081) (0.087) (0.095) (0.081)
Bought Same Brand AND
Product Line
0.731*** 0.558*** 0.588***
(0.121) (0.142) (0.129)
Experience × Same Brand
AND Product Line
-0.035 0.555***
(0.201) (0.167)
Experience × Same Brand 0.995*** 0.953***
(0.175) (0.212)
Bought Other Brands (same
owner)
-0.220
(0.349)
Effect of Experience with Del Valle on...
Bela Vista 200 ml 0.789** 0.741** 0.805*** 0.753** 0.758** 0.789**
(0.309) (0.308) (0.309) (0.309) (0.309) (0.309)
Kapo 200 ml 0.573** 0.472** 0.541** 0.458* 0.462** 0.583**
(0.229) (0.232) (0.231) (0.235) (0.232) (0.229)
Leco 1L 0.280 0.116 0.390 0.170 0.304 0.287
(0.298) (0.296) (0.301) (0.299) (0.301) (0.298)
Leco 1L light -0.129 -0.273 -0.002 -0.215 -0.076 -0.114
(0.332) (0.329) (0.334) (0.332) (0.335) (0.333)
Maguary 1L 1.337*** 1.252*** 1.262*** 1.197*** 1.202*** 1.340***
(0.207) (0.205) (0.208) (0.206) (0.207) (0.208)
Maguary 1L light 1.100*** 1.027*** 1.016*** 0.961*** 0.964*** 1.098***
(0.283) (0.279) (0.284) (0.280) (0.280) (0.283)
Maguary 200 ml -0.301 -0.386 -0.376 -0.440 -0.436 -0.298
(0.273) (0.271) (0.273) (0.272) (0.273) (0.273)
Sufresh 1L 1.645*** 1.571*** 1.641*** 1.576*** 1.613*** 1.646***
(0.282) (0.283) (0.283) (0.283) (0.282) (0.282)
Xando 1L 0.151 0.046 0.097 0.022 0.019 0.152
(0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.154) (0.153) (0.153)
Xando 300 ml 0.777*** 0.672*** 0.722*** 0.647*** 0.645*** 0.778***
(0.234) (0.234) (0.233) (0.235) (0.234) (0.234)
Alternative Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Number of Consumers 219 219 219 219 219 219
Number of Shopping Trips 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730
Likelihood Ratio -3833 -3816 -3825 -3807 -3819 -3833
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the consumer level and reported in parentheses. The first eight shopping trips of each consumer are dropped.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.10: Analysis at the level of the product line.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -0.271*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Experience -2.120*** -1.770*** -3.062*** -1.769*** -3.061***
(0.058) (0.062) (0.115) (0.062) (0.115)
Loyalty GL 2.235*** 2.226*** 2.226*** 2.226*** 2.226***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Bought Same Brand 0.727*** 0.330*** 0.725*** 0.329***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Experience × Same Brand 2.341*** 2.339***
(0.135) (0.135)
Bought Other Brands (same
owner)
0.320 0.295
(0.202) (0.203)
Kapo 0.359*** 0.145*** 0.382*** -0.166 0.095
(0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.204) (0.206)
Del Valle 0.446*** 0.178*** 0.377*** 0.179*** 0.378***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Leco -0.370*** -0.606*** -0.674*** -0.914*** -0.957***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.067) (0.207) (0.207)
Maguary 0.478*** 0.223*** 0.414*** 0.225*** 0.415***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049)
Sufresh 0.097** -0.148*** 0.062 -0.147*** 0.063
(0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051)
Xando -0.093* 0.149*** 0.099* 0.147*** 0.097*
(0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
Consumers 219 219 219 219 219
Observations 13124 13124 13124 13124 13124
Log Likelihood -14613 -14499 -14324 -14497 -14323
This table reports the results of the mixed logit model with alternative specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the consumer level and reported in parentheses.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 3
An Investigation of Retail
Outlet Choice
1
3.1 Introduction
Consumers’ shopping behavior varies with demographic and market charac-
teristics. In particular, household characteristics are relevant for studying the
choice of retail outlet. Families that shop at clubstores like Costco or Sams
Club are different than those that buy food at drugstores like CVS or Duane
Reade. This paper explores household differences across types of retail outlet
when shopping for groceries.
Earlier work has focused on shopping behavior mostly within traditional
food retail outlets (e.g. Safeway and Stop & Shop). Some researchers have
1I would like to thank Michael Harris and Phillip Kaufman from Economic Research
Services - U.S. Department of Agriculture for helpful discussions and for making the AC
Nielsen data available for this work. The empirical work of this chapter was done during
two internships at the ERS/USDA.
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recognized the importance of looking at consumers’ choice for stores, but have
confined themselves to those traditional retailers. This approach, however,
does not take into account a major shift in the way American consumers
do their grocery shopping: buying food at retailers better known for sell-
ing clothes, or aspirin. Nontraditional retail outlets represent about 30% of
household expenditures on groceries. Hausman and Leibtag (2004) say that
the growth of nontraditional retail food outlets in the United States has trans-
formed the food market landscape. Leibtag (2006) shows that the market share
of traditional food retailers fell from 82% in 1998 to 69% in 2003. Separat-
ing nontraditional formats into grocery stores, drugstores, convenience stores,
superstores, mass merchandisers and clubstores, should improve our under-
standing of (i) how important different household and market characteristics
are for the choice of a certain type of retail outlet when shopping for groceries,
and (ii) how important these different formats are for a family’s food expen-
diture.
A deeper look into retail outlet choice for groceries is important in at least
two ways. First, competition in the food retail sector has always attracted
attention from competition authorities due to a tendency for concentration
and potential welfare loss. Thus, there is much work done in supermarket
competition because of its policy implications (Smith, 2004). But as other al-
ternatives of retail outlets become alternatives for households’ food shopping,
these types should be taken into account in the analysis, as they might affect
substitution patterns.
A second and maybe more important reason to pay closer attention to
different types of retail outlets is when a policy targets a certain consumer
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group. For instance, there is anecdotal evidence that low-income consumers
pay more for food than high-income ones. Whether or not low-income house-
holds are less likely to frequent retail food outlets that offer more economical
and healthful food sources than higher-income households is largely an unan-
swered question. Moreover, expenditure on food for low-income consumers is
a important share of their monthly income. Figure 3.1 shows that households
with annual income below $15,000 spend 30% of their after-tax income on
food. This share is only about 8% for households with income above $70,000.
This justifies programs such as the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) of the Center for
Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP) in the United States, which is de-
signed to supplement a person’s income with food stamps. In order to define
how much to give each household, the CNPP needs to have an estimate of how
much people pay for food. But this also requires knowing where consumers do
their grocery shopping.
This paper addresses this question focusing on the demographic character-
istics of consumers that affect the probability of choice of different types of
retail outlets. In particular, do low-income households shop differently than
upper income households? Do Asians and Blacks shop differently than Cau-
casians?
The dataset used in this paper is the AC Nielsen’s Homescan R© panel of
households. This panel provides revealed preference data, which are data on
actual decisions and outcomes. The Nielsen data track the shopping behavior
of households and has information on their demographic characteristics.
Multinomial logit results show that income, household size and ethnicity
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significantly affect these choices. The results show that higher income increases
the probability of shopping in clubstores and mass merchandisers relative to
traditional grocery stores and it reduces the household’s probability of grocery
shopping in drugstores, supercenters and convenience stores. Larger families
are more likely to visit mass merchandisers, supercenters and clubstores and
less likely to shop for food in the other types of retail outlets, especially in
convenience stores. In spite of taking income and household size into account,
ethnicity still matters significantly for retail outlet choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the
literature and the model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the growing literature of store choice, and in par-
ticular to studies related to food retail. Store choice has been modeled at the
aggregate level since the analysis of spatial competition of Hotelling (1929).
More recently, analysis of shopping behavior at the household level has been
enabled by the availability of scanner data panels and advances in choice mod-
eling (Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009).
Smith (2004) studies the effect of multi-store supermarkets on competition
in the U.K. To evaluate its importance he estimates a consumer model that
combines discrete store choice with a continuous expenditure decision. The
latter is included because high-volume retailers are expected to choose lower
margins in equilibrium than low-volume stores or convenience retailers. The
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paper shows that market power, measured as high price-cost markups, in-
creases significantly with the number of stores that the chain operates. Smith
(2006) uses a similar consumer choice model for supermarket chains to eval-
uate regulation on store size and location of supermarkets in the U.K. By
estimating a consumer choice model for supermarket chains and conditioning
on store characteristics, he finds that most consumers have a preference for
middle-sized and nearby stores.
Katz (2007) attempts to uncover parameters that govern the trade-off
among store size, bundle cost and travel time determining consumers’ choice of
supermarkets. Katz improves on previous consumer choice models by allowing
the decision on store and bundle to be simultaneous. When choosing where to
shop, consumers compare their utility from going to different stores based on
the bundle of products they intend to purchase at those stores. The optimal
bundle varies across stores as prices and availability vary. Therefore the choice
set for grocery shopping includes the stores the consumer can visit and all the
potential bundles of products she can purchase. Hence, the actual choice set
that the consumer faces can be very large. Using partial identification, he
only needs to select a few counterfactual visits to identify the parameters of
interest. The disadvantage of Katz’s model is that it can only be used to com-
pare quite similar stores. Therefore he restricts his sample to only traditional
grocery stores.
Hausman and Leibtag (2004) show that there can be substantial loss in
not considering other types of retail outlets where households do their grocery
shopping. They focus on the presence of Wal-Mart in local retail markets in
the United States and show that there can be substantial bias in the calcula-
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tion of the Consumer Price Index by ignoring consumers’ expenditure share
in supercenters.
According to Hausman and Leibtag (2004), nontraditional shopping for-
mats have captured a significant share from traditional grocery outlets. How-
ever, Leibtag (2006) shows that supercenters and mass merchandisers are not
the only formats with exceptional growth in the past decade. Drugstores and
warehouse clubstores have also expanded their food offerings and taken market
share from traditional grocery stores. Nonetheless, the store choice literature
has focused almost exclusively on grocery stores (e.g. Shaws or Stop & Shop)
(Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998, Bell and Lattin 1998, Smith 2004, Smith 2006,Katz
2007).
Similar to this paper, Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish (2004) also study
choice across different retail channels. They focus on the choice among gro-
cery stores, drugstores and mass merchandisers. It was the first paper of choice
across retail formats. They model the shopping behavior of 96 households at
six different store chains representing the three major retail formats of interest
in a major U.S. market not disclosed by the authors. The results show that
households that prefer to spend more at grocery stores also prefer to spend
more at mass merchandisers. Based on this finding the authors conclude that
the substitution effect between grocery and nongrocery formats is not as strong
as grocery retailers fear. Their findings also suggest that consumer expendi-
tures respond more to varying levels of assortment and promotion than price,
where assortment is defined as the number of products in each product cate-
gory, weighted by the household’s average product bundle.
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This paper includes visits to all types of retail outlets where consumers
can buy food products. The data include drugstores, convenience stores, su-
percenters, mass merchandisers and clubstores along with traditional grocery
stores to quantify how important each store type of food retail outlet is for
consumers in the United States, and to explore the heterogeneity of consumers
across these different types of outlets.
3.3 Model
A multinomial logit model is used to analyze consumers’ choice of retail outlet
categories. The model can be described as follows.
Consumer i chooses option j if and only if Uij > Uiz for every z 6= j,
where Uij is the random utility of choosing alternative j for consumer i. The
subscript j identifies each alternative (j = 1, ..., J).
Characteristics of the decision maker are denoted by Si and market charac-
teristics are labeled by Mm. A fixed effect, ξj, is included to capture constant
characteristics of the retail outlet type j. In addition, consumer random ef-
fects ηi are included to account for the fact that shopping trips by the same
consumer are not independent from each other. Utility is assumed to be linear
in the observable attributes. Therefore Uijt can be rewritten as
Uijt = αjSi + ψjMm + ξj + ηi + εijt (3.1)
where εijt is the part of the utility function which is unobserved by the econo-
metrician. The random term, εijt, is assumed to have a type 1 extreme value
distribution. Thus, conditional on ηi, the consumers make a multinomial logit
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choice. The parameters in vector ψj are identified by cross-regional variation
and parameters in vector αj are identified by cross-individual variation.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data Sources
The main data source used in this paper is the AC Nielsen’s Homescan R©
panel of households from year 2002 to 2004. The Homescan dataset is a re-
volving panel of about 41,000 households throughout the United States, where
households are sampled to represent the demographic and the geographic dis-
tribution of the country’s population. Households in a smaller sample (about
9,500) are also asked to record random weight purchases (e.g., produce, meat
and deli products sold by weight). The latter is the sample used in this paper.
The AC Nielsen’s Homescan R© panel provides revealed preference data,
which are drawn on actual decisions and outcomes. The dataset consists of
individual purchases of at-home foods. Panel participants are requested to
scan in their purchase information at home after they finish shopping. The
purchase data are uploaded from their at-home device to Nielsen’s computer
system. Transaction prices for food product purchases and information on the
attributes of the product are recorded. This information is paired with the
household’s demographic information provided when they signed up with the
program.
For each trip there is information on the products purchased with their
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UPC codes2, the description of the products, whether a coupon was used,
quantity or weight, detailed information on the characteristics of each prod-
uct, the date of the trip, name of the store, and finally the total trip expendi-
ture. Unfortunately, the panel does not contain zip codes for every store. In
particular, it does not have zip codes for any of the drugstores, convenience
stores and smaller stores contained in the “others” category. Appendix 3.A.3
contains a list of the variables found in Homescan data.
A common concern regarding the use of these data is sample selection. Par-
ticipating in the panel can be time consuming, which may lead time-sensitive
consumers not to participate. Furthermore, consumers gather points by partic-
ipating, which they can later redeem for various merchandise. These benefits
might lead to over participation by income and price-sensitive consumers.
In addition to the Homescan R© panel, information from Market Scope 2004
is used to measure the presence of larger stores by counting the number of club-
stores and supercenters in each of the 52 metropolitan regions. This accounts
for the fact that larger stores are not evenly distributed across metropolitan
regions.3
3.4.2 Consumer Characteristics
In order to get a sense of possible biases due to sample participation, Table
3.1 provides summary statistics on households’ demographic variables from the
Homescan R© panel. The last column displays the census means or medians
for those variables. The census year to which the statistic belongs is provided
2A UPC (Universal Product Code) is the barcode number printed on the package which
is used to scan the product at the register.
3Grocery stores, drug stores and convenience stores tend to be smaller and also more
evenly distributed in metropolitan areas.
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in parenthesis.
Households in the sample have somewhat lower median income than the
national average4, but the median income is very close. This suggests that
the upper part of the income distribution might be under-represented in the
panel. This is consistent with the notion that it is difficult to find households
with very high income that are willing to participate in the panel. The usual
conclusion is that this right-censoring of the income distribution might lead
to panel participants being more price-sensitive. This sample bias should be
considered when interpreting results obtained from analysis of the Homescan
R© panel.
Nonetheless, household size and the proportion of each race in the sample
are very close to the averages reported by the Census Bureau.
3.4.3 Retail Formats
The classification of retail formats defined by AC Nielsen is followed and retail-
ers are grouped into mass merchandisers, supercenters, clubstores, drugstores,
convenience stores and other stores. Traditional supermarkets offer a full line
of groceries, meat, and produce. Mass merchandisers are large stores that sell
primarily home appliances, clothing, electronics, and sporting goods but also
carry grocery and non-edible grocery items. Supercenters are a hybrid of a
large traditional supermarket and a mass merchandiser. They offer a wide
variety of food as well as non-food merchandise. This classification accounts
for the fact that certain outlets of large retail chains, such as as Walmart or
Target, can either be mass merchandiser (e.g. “Wal Mart Regular”, “Target
Regular”) or supercenters (e.g. “Walmart Supercenters”, “Super Target”) de-
4The difference is statistically significant at 1% level
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pending on their size and assortment.5 Clubstores, also known as warehouse
clubs, require consumers’ membership and are a retail and wholesale hybrid
format with a varied selection and limited variety of products presented in a
warehouse-type environment (e.g. Sams Club, Costco, and BJs). The gro-
cery line is generally dedicated to large sizes and bulk sales. Drugstores are
a prescription-based drug store, but generate a part of their total sales from
groceries, general merchandise, and seasonal items (e.g. CVS, Walgreens and
Duane Reade). The “others” category includes dollar stores, bakeries, military
stores, online purchases, health food stores and vending machines.
The first column of Table 3.2 shows how much each retail channel represents
in consumers’ food and beverage expenditures. Thirty percent of consumers’
expenditure comes from non-traditional grocery channels.
Differences across these outlet types also become visible when splitting the
sample into low-, medium- and high-income households.6 Low- and medium-
income households make about 11% of their grocery purchases in supercenters
and mass merchandisers together, relative to the 7% share of high-income
households’ expenditure. However, high-income consumers spend more in
clubstores (11.42 %) than in other large formats (6.23%). Low-income house-
holds spend more in convenience stores than everyone, and medium-income
households spend more in drugstores than everybody else. Table 3.2 indicates
5For instance, according to the website of Walmart, the size of a Walmart Supercenter
has an average of 185,000 square feet and employs about 350 or more associates. Walmart
Neighborhood markets (or Walmart Regular) have an average size of 42,000 square feet and
employ about 95 associates.
6Income groups are defined following Blisard, Stewart, and Jollife (2004) and Stewart
and Blisard (2008). Low income: 130% or below the poverty line (the cutoff for food
stamp eligibility). Middle income: 130% to 150% of the poverty line. High income: 150%
or above the poverty line. The poverty line is defined by the Poverty Guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We use information from the HHS
reports from 2002 to 2004.
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that there are different patterns of retail outlet across income groups.
3.4.4 Shopping Mode
Households spend on average $18.62 per shopping trip when they buy food and
beverages (see Table 3.3). This might seem low at first when one thinks about
a family’s grocery shopping trip. But by considering all occasions where con-
sumers buy food or beverages, a quick stop at a retailer to buy, for instance, a
yogurt will also count. In order to separate these quick stops from actual gro-
cery shopping trips, consumer’s shopping trips are divided into primary and
secondary trips following Smith (2004) and using information on consumer
expenditure by retail choice. In particular, primary trips are those with the
highest weekly expenditure, while all others are considered secondary shopping
trips. As income rises, expenditure on both primary and secondary shopping
trips rise as well, while the number of secondary shopping trips remains at
three per week (see Table 3.3).
Across all shopping trips, 70% of consumers’ expenditures are at grocery
stores (column 1). Moreover, on average three quarter of all primary shopping
expenditure happens at grocery stores (column 5), whereas this ratio drops
to 60 % for secondary trips (column 9). This suggests that primary and sec-
ondary shopping trips serve different shopping needs. This is also reflected in
the mean expenditure for primary ($33.05) and secondary ($9.71) shopping
trips. In addition, the increase in expenditure share of “Others” from 7.05%
to 16.67% between primary and secondary shopping trips supports the notion
that secondary shopping trips serve different needs. “Others” includes book-
stores, dollar stores and department stores, which are visited by consumers
not primarily for grocery shopping, but for other shopping motives.
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Interestingly, shoppers of different income levels devote similar shares of
the beverage and groceries expenditure to traditional grocery stores. Nev-
ertheless, the difference lies on where they spread the rest of that budget.
As already highlighted in Table 3.2, high-income households spend more in
clubstores than low-income households for their primary and secondary shop-
ping trips (primary shopping trips: 12.15% vs. 5.06%; secondary shopping
trips: 9.79% vs. 3.77%). Similarly, low-income households spend more in su-
percenters than high-income households (primary shopping trips: 10.07% vs.
4.27%; secondary shopping trips: 8.15% vs. 4.71%).
By construction, primary shopping trips are characterized by greater ex-
penditure. The data show that on average consumers spend 73% of their
budget on primary visits. Smith (2004) finds a very similar pattern in his data
for the UK: only 20% of total expenditure comes from secondary shopping
trips. He argues that planning mistakes are likely to account for a significant
portion of this. Hence, differentiation based on secondary spending is proba-
bly only a small fraction of overall grocery spending. Smith (2004) mentions
that specialized shops such as butchers might play a role when it comes to dif-
ferentiation. However, in the United States most of the foods that in Europe
would be offered by specialty stores, such as bakeries or butchers, are offered
in regular supermarkets.7
7As the definition of shopping mode is arbitrary, Table 3.4 displays expenditure share by
income group and retail format of the largest shopping trip in a month in contrast to defining
it as the largest shopping trip in a week as done in Table 3.3. Defining primary shopping
trips in that way assumes that consumers make only one big shopping trip per month, while
all other visits are “fill-in” trips. The expenditure shares do not change substantially if
compared to the primary shopping trips of Table 3.3.
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3.5 Results
Table 3.5 presents results of a multinomial logit model for households’ choice
of type of retail outlet. The model is estimated using household-level ran-
dom intercepts to relax the assumption of conditional independence among
the shopping trips of the same households given the covariates. Coefficients
are displayed as odds ratios and should be interpreted relative to the choice of
grocery stores which is the base category. Because the models are estimated
with household-level random coefficients, odds ratios are household specific.
According to Table 3.5, higher income statistically increases the probability
of shopping in clubstores (odds ratio of 1.007). This is consistent with Tables
3.2 and 3.3. Moreover, the multinomial logit results indicate that higher in-
come is also associated with a significantly higher probability of shopping at
mass merchandisers (odds ratio of 1.001). This pattern was not reflected in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3, and is due to the fact that the multinomial logit regression
conditions on household characteristics by including a household’s ethnicity
and size. An increase in a household’s income reduces the likelihood of gro-
cery shopping in drugstores, supercenters and convenience stores as reflected
by odds ratios less than one.
Computing the likelihood of shopping at specific retail outlets at different
income levels allows the estimation of the economic magnitude: the difference
in income of a two-person household between the 25th percentile and the 50th
percentile is about $17,500 in 2003. An increase in income of that amount
decreases the probability of a household choosing a drugstore over a tradi-
tional grocery store by 5.25%8. Similarly, it would generate an increase in the
8The statistically significant odds ratio of 0.997 on Table 3.5 implies that an increase of
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likelihood of frequenting mass merchandisers (clubstores) by 1.25% (12.15%).
Thus, an increase in income increase a household’s shopping at mass merchan-
disers and clubstores, whereas it decreases the likelihood of frequenting drug
stores, supercenters, or convenience stores.
An increase in household size also changes the shopping households’ choice
of retail outlets. In particular, a larger household has a higher probability
of visiting mass merchandisers (odds ratio of 1.138), supercenters (1.157) and
clubstores (1.164) and a lower probability of grocery shopping in other types
of retail outlets. The estimated odds ratios indicate that the addition of one
person to the household increases the likelihood of it doing grocery shopping
in a mass merchandiser, supercenter or a clubstore versus a traditional grocery
store by, respectively, 14%, 16% and 17%. On the other hand, it decreases the
probabilities of visiting a drugstore and convenience stores by, respectively,
9% (odds ratio of 0.91%) and 2% (0.978%). This is consistent with the no-
tion that larger households explore benefits of quantity discounts, which mass
merchandisers, supercenters and clubstores are known for.
Ethnicity is an important predictor of retail outlet choice even controlling
for income and household size differences. The estimated coefficients for the
included ethnicity indicator variables should always be compared to the choices
of a white person as they are the omitted category. Blacks tend to do more
grocery shopping in convenience stores compared to other households. Asians,
on the other hand, are more likely to visit grocery stores than any other kind
of retail outlet type, which is reflected in the fact that the odds ratio is always
$1,000 in income generates 0.3% reduction in the probability of visiting a drugstore than
a grocery store (1-0.997=0.03). Thus, multiplying 0.3% by 17.5 shows that an increase of
$17,500 in income decreases the probability of visiting a drugstore than a grocery store by
5.25%.
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below one. This finding could also be due to the fact that ethnic food stores
are included in the group of grocery stores.
As discussed above, Table 3.3 shows some difference in shopping patterns
within primary and secondary shopping trips across retail outlets and income
groups. Conditioning on household characteristics allows to further explore the
different patterns between primary and secondary shopping trips. Moreover,
estimating the multinomial logit regression for the two subsamples, primary
and secondary shopping trips, separately allows the effect of household char-
acteristics to vary across the two subsamples. Table 3.6 shows the result of
the model estimated for the two different samples and suggests that there are
some differences when examining characteristics that affect households’ choice
of retail outlets.
When shopping trips are divided into primary and secondary trips, income
and household size affect the probability of choosing each outlet with different
intensities although always in the same direction. For instance, a one-person
increase in household size decreases the probability of choosing a drugstore
over a traditional grocery store by 20% (odds ratio of 0.807) for primary shop-
ping trips but only by 7% (0.925) for secondary shopping trips. Similarly for
convenience stores, the addition of one person to the household reduces the
likelihood of visiting this type of retail outlet by 8% (0.919) relative to grocery
stores for primary shopping trips but 1.5% (0.985) for secondary trips. This
suggests a distinct pattern between primary and secondary shopping trips,
and is consistent with the idea that secondary shopping trips are last minute
runs when convenience is more important. This might also be reflected in the
fact that large households care less about quantity benefits on their secondary
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shopping trips because they buy less in secondary shopping trips. That would
also explain why the probability of visiting a club store rather than a super-
market for the primary shopping trip increases by 22% (odds ratio of 1.216)
when a household increases by one person, and that same probability increases
by 16% (1.16), slightly less, for the secondary shopping trip. A similar pattern
emerges when looking at supercenters.
High-income households are even less likely to choose drugstores and conve-
nience stores relative to supermarkets on primary trips than secondary trips.
But they are even more likely to choose supercenters, clubstores and mass
merchandisers over traditional grocery stores on their secondary shopping trip
than on the primary. This is somewhat counterintuitive as one would expect
big-box stores to be chosen for large purchases and not as a secondary trip.
One possible explanation for this finding is that higher income households visit
these formats for different motives than food shopping, although they also end
up buying food. Another possibility is that they have more than one “pri-
mary” trip per week. This suggests that other ways to classify the shopping
trip mode should be explored.
Interestingly, the suggestion of ethnic sorting is even stronger once we di-
vide the sample according to shopping modes (i.e. primary and secondary
shopping trips). Blacks are more than twice as likely to do their primary
grocery shopping at drugstores rather than grocery stores than Whites (odds
ratio of 2.149), and 70% more likely to visit convenience stores (odds ratio of
1.834). Furthermore, Asians exhibit a different choice pattern of retail out-
lets between primary and secondary shopping trips. Whereas Asians are 80%
(odds ration of 1.867) more likely to choose a drugstore than Whites for the
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primary shopping trip, they are about 50% (odds ratio of 0.467) less likely
to visit it again for the secondary shopping trip. A similar pattern emerges
when looking at the likelihood of Asians visiting a clubstore for primary and
secondary shopping trips. In particular, the findings suggest that Asians are
always more likely to visit traditional grocery stores than other retail outlets
for their secondary shopping trips. This can be seen by the fact that the esti-
mated coefficient on the Asian indicator is always less than one for secondary
shopping trips.
Grocery stores, drugstores and convenience stores are present in large num-
bers in all market areas included in the AC Nielsen’s database, but the presence
of larger stores varies. Therefore, in Table 3.7, the number of supercenters and
clubstores for each region is included in the regression to verify how robust the
earlier findings are with respect to variables that affect households’ choices.
Qualitatively the results hold and (i) higher income increases the likelihood of
shopping in clubstores, (ii) an increase in household size also increases the like-
lihood of visiting mass merchandisers, supercenters and clubstores, and (iii)
the aforementioned patterns across different ethnicities remain. Furthermore,
the estimated coefficients on these two variables indicates that the larger the
number of these stores in the market, the smaller the probability of households
doing grocery shopping in drugstores or convenience stores. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficient on the number of clubstores for mass merchandiser is also
greater than one (primary shopping trips: 1.009; secondary shopping trips:
1.014). This suggests that a greater presence of clubstores in a metropoli-
tan area also increases the likelihood of shopping at a mass merchandiser.
However, it is not possible to draw a causal conclusion as an area of more
clubstores can also have more mass merchandisers which might then increase
102
the likelihood of consumers shopping there.
3.6 Limitations and Extensions
The results presented in this paper address the question of who shops where.
However to further understand consumers’ shopping behavior, it is important
to include key drivers of consumers’ decisions in across a set of products. The
main variables considered in the literature as determinants of store choice are
prices, travel distance, store characteristics and assortment.
3.6.1 Price
It is important to account for how much price affects the probability of choos-
ing a certain type of retail outlet. However, it is difficult to construct a price
index that is comparable across stores. One could define a bundle of goods to
construct such an index, but that is not easy to do when comparing different
types of retail outlets as their product assortment can be very different. Katz
(2007) constructs a weekly price index for every chain store in the sample. To
do so, he matches over 6,000 UPC codes across chains and weeks for the stores
under contract. For these stores, he calculates an expenditure-weighted price
index based on the matched products. The expenditure weights are derived
from expenditures on the products over all stores in his sample. While this
price index is not perfect, it is comparable across all stores. But he only con-
siders a set of very similar stores. One would expect that the typical bundle
of foods and beverages that consumers buy at a drugstore are very different
than the bundle that consumers buy at a club center. Therefore, a meaningful
price index would be harder to create to compare price levels between different
types of retail formats.
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Farina, Monteiro, and Nunes (2005) study competition among supermar-
kets, traditional retailers (e.g. bakeries, butchers and open markets) and in-
dependent supermarkets in Brazil. As they are comparing different types of
retail formats, Farina, Nunes and Monteiro choose to work with price indexes
of twelve products instead of working with a price index for a broader bundle
of goods. This strategy is chosen due to the difference in assortment across
different types of formats. For instance, they compare the prices of fresh rolls
in supermarkets and in bakeries. For fresh sardines, they compare the prices
in open markets and in supermarkets. Thus, prices in different formats are
always compared to prices charged by supermarkets. An insight that can be
drawn from this approach is that one can construct a bundle of products for
each retail outlet type that would be comparable to supermarkets only. They
need not be comparable across all types of retail formats. Similarly, one would
not need to construct a common bundle between drugstores and clubstores.
Smith (2004) uses gross profit margins as a proxy for the price level at
each store instead of using direct price data. In the models prices are incorpo-
rated as an unobserved firm characteristic. Smith estimates price parameters
by minimizing the difference between predicted and observed profit margins.
This can be a particularly useful approach when retail outlets are very differ-
ent in the products they offer.
Smith (2006) estimates a model of choice and expenditure in which price is
also included as an unobserved variable at the firm level together with quality.
For firms that do not set a national price, Smith allows firm dummies to vary
by region.
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Measurement error
When using prices from the Nielsen Homescan panel one needs to be aware of
a potential source of measurement error. Households report price data only
for stores that do not have a contract with Nielsen. If there is a contract
with the store, consumers do not need to report the prices paid and Nielsen
uses information on the weekly quantity-weighted average price paid by all
consumers provided by each store. Thus, prices actually paid by the consumer
can be different from the prices that appear in the panel.
3.6.2 Distance
One very important determinant for consumers’ store choice is travel time and
distance. Katz (2007) calculates distance between the shopper’s home and
the retailer’s closest stores using zip codes. Unfortunately, the panel used in
the present study does not have information on the location for all stores.
In particular it does not have location information for any of the drugstores,
convenience stores and the ones in the “others” category.
Another transportation cost shifter is car ownership. Consumers that have
cars are likely to travel longer distances to shop, whereas the ones that have to
use public transportation might face higher transportation costs for the same
distance. This is also not given in the panel dataset.
Including distance in the model could help explain why lower-income house-
holds are more likely to shop at convenience stores and drugstores than high-
income ones. When it comes to grocery shopping, one would expect low-
income households to be more price sensitive, and we also know that big retail
stores tend to offer better deals for certain products than smaller retail stores.
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A likely explanation is the existence of different transportation costs across
consumers. If low-income households face higher costs to reach the larger
shopping centers, this may explain the more restrictive patterns of retail food
outlet visits, and the potentially higher food prices they face.
3.6.3 Assortment
In studying choice across retail formats, Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish (2004)
show that consumer expenditures respond more to varying levels of assortment
and promotion than price. They define assortment as a measure of the number
of products in each category, weighted by the household’s average expenditure
shares across categories. Thus, it reflects the variety of products offered within
categories.
Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009) also find that assortments are more
important than prices in consumers’ choice among grocery stores, but not
more important than distance. Following previous literature (e.g. Boatwright,
Briesch, and Fox (2001); Borle, Boatwright, Kadane, Nunes, and Shmueli
(2005); Broniarczyk and Hoyer (2006); and Corstjen and Lal (2000)), they
treat assortment as a multidimensional attribute, including the number of
stock-keeping units (SKUs), unique SKUs to the retailer, brands, SKUs per
brand and sizes per brand scanned weekly at each store. Their results also
suggest households that prefer larger assortments value shorter distance less,
and vice-versa. Moreover households’ preferences for assortment depend on
the presence of their favorite item, a similar result presented by Broniarczyk
and McAlister (1998).
Among the measures used by Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009)), the
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following could be used in the current study: number of brands and number of
sizes per brand. They do not use number of product categories as they claim
that grocery stores carry the same categories. However, this might be relevant
when dealing with different types of store formats as categories might vary
significantly.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper stresses the importance of nontraditional types of retail outlets
for households’ food expenditures in the United States. It contributes to the
literature by showing that consumers’ likelihood of visiting each type of retail
outlet for grocery shopping varies with demographic characteristics.
A multinomial logit model is estimated using household-level scanner data
for the United States. There are a number of interesting results.The results
show that higher income increases the probability of shopping in clubstores and
mass merchandisers relative to traditional grocery stores, and it reduces the
household’s probability of grocery shopping in drugstores, supercenters and
convenience stores. Lower income households are more likely to shop at con-
venience stores and drugstores than high-income ones. Larger families have a
higher probability of visiting mass merchandisers, supercenters and clubstores
and lower probability of shopping for food in other types of retail outlets, espe-
cially in convenience stores. Despite controlling for income and household size
differences, the results suggest significant ethnic sorting as the choice of retail
outlets is very different among Whites, Blacks and Asians. These patterns
also hold once the sample is split into primary and secondary shopping trips.
Moreover, the presence of larger stores in a market diminishes the probability
107
of consumers shopping in drugstores and convenience stores, but does not af-
fect the overall shopping pattern across retail outlets. However, as mentioned
before households in the sample have slightly lower income than the national
average, which is consistent with the notion that panel participants might be
more income- or price-sensitive. It is not clear how that would bias the results,
but it should be kept in mind when using the findings of this paper for policy
application.
The results of this paper are important for policies that target certain
consumer groups such as the Thrifty Food Plan. Deciding how much to give
each household requires the CNPP to have an estimate of how much people
pay for food, but this also requires knowing where consumers shop. Moreover,
various countries adopt legislation that restricts the location of certain types
of retail formats. Examples are the U.K., France, Argentina and Indonesia.
Other countries like Brazil prohibit food sales in drugstores and medicine sales
in supermarkets. The findings of this paper suggest that such policies can
affect various consumer groups differently and therefore should be considered
in their design.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Figures
Figure 3.1: Households Expenditure Share on Food
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3.A.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Household Characteristics.
Observations Mean Standard
Devia-
tion
Median Census Mean Census Median
Household Size 8533 2.4 1.34 2 2.57 (2003) 2 (2004)
Household Income 8533 58,769 22,867 47,500 60,446 (2004) 44,334 (2004)
White 8533 76% - - 75.1% (2000) -
Black 8533 13.71% - - 12.3% (2000) -
Asian 8533 3.03% - - 3.6%(2000) -
Other Race 8533 6.95% - - 9%(2000) -
Weekly Shopping
Trips
8533 3.92 2.54 3 - -
Source: AC Nielsen Homescan R©.
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Table 3.2: Expenditure shares by channel format and household income.
All Income Groups
——- ————————————
All Low Medium High
Grocery
Store
70.03% 69.93% 69.26% 71.49%
Drugstore 1.09% 1.07% 1.17% 0.95%
Mass Mer-
chandiser
2.21% 2.34% 2.40% 1.82%
Supercenter 7.46% 9.44% 8.85% 4.41%
Clubstore 8.55% 4.64% 7.49% 11.42%
Convenience
Store
0.51% 1.05% 0.52% 0.36%
Others 10.15% 11.52% 10.30% 9.56%
Source: AC Nielsen Homescan R©.
Income groups are defined following Blisard, Stewart, and Jollife (2004) and Stewart and Blisard (2008). Low income:
130% or below the poverty line (the cutoff for food stamp eligibility). Middle income: 130% to 150% of the poverty
line. High income: 150% or above the poverty line. The poverty line is defined by the Poverty Guidelines of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We use information from the HHS reports from 2002 to 2004.
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Table 3.3: Expenditure shares by shopping mode and household income.
All
Trips
A: Primary Trips B: Secondary Trips
——- ———————————— ————————————
Household Income Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Low Medium High All Low Medium High All
Grocery
Store
70.03% 74.59% 73.72% 75.33% 74.31% 60.27% 60.15% 62.96% 61.03%
Drugstore 1.09% 0.46% 0.41% 0.30% 0.37% 2.32% 2.74% 2.41% 2.60%
Mass Mer-
chandiser
2.21% 1.30% 1.20% 0.93% 1.12% 4.50% 4.87% 3.78% 4.50%
Supercenter 7.46% 10.07% 9.33% 4.27% 7.72% 8.15% 7.88% 4.71% 6.91%
Clubstore 8.55% 5.06% 8.18% 12.15% 9.25% 3.77% 6.09% 9.79% 7.07%
Convenience
Store
0.51% 0.49% 0.16% 0.12% 0.17% 2.23% 1.25% 0.89% 1.21%
Others 10.15% 8.04% 7.01% 6.90% 7.05% 18.75% 17.03% 15.46% 16.67%
Mean
Expenditure
per Trip
$18.62 $24.80 $32.89 $36.00 $33.05 $8.63 $9.39 $10.75 $9.71
Median
Number of
Trips per
Week
1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Source: AC Nielsen Homescan R©.
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Table 3.4: Expenditure shares for the largest shopping trip of the month.
All Trips Primary Trip (one per month)
——- ————————————
Household Income
All Low Medium High All
Grocery
Store
70.03% 75.42% 72.70% 73.48% 73.17%
Drugstore 1.09% 0.23% 0.18% 0.14% 0.17%
Mass Mer-
chandiser
2.21% 0.90% 0.76% 0.61% 0.72%
Supercenter 7.46% 10.04% 8.77% 3.82% 7.24%
Clubstore 8.55% 5.90% 10.41% 14.93% 11.54%
Convenience
Store
0.51% 0.15% 0.07% 0.06% 0.07%
Others 10.15% 7.35% 7.12% 6.97% 7.09%
Source: AC Nielsen Homescan R©.
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Table 3.5: Multinomial Logit
All Shopping Trips
Drugstore Mass Mer-
chandiser
Supercenter Clubstore Convenience
Store
Others
Income 0.997*** 1.001** 0.995*** 1.007*** 0.995*** 0.997***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size
0.91*** 1.138*** 1.157*** 1.164*** 0.978*** 0.95***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Black 1.431*** 0.979 0.724*** 0.796*** 1.147*** 1.572***
(0.046) (0.031) (0.023) (0.026) (0.04) (0.047)
Asian 0.916** 0.478*** 0.116*** 0.866*** 0.367*** 0.761***
(0.034) (0.018) (0.006) (0.03) (0.02) (0.024)
Other Ethnicity 0.808*** 0.8*** 0.457*** 0.738*** 0.774*** 0.98
(0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026)
Constant 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.092*** 0.035*** 0.04*** 0.254***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Number of Observations 985014 985014 985014 985014 985014 985014
Number of Households 8533 8533 8533 8533 8533 8533
***Household Random Coefficients
Variance 1.3991908 (.02234782)
Note: Household Random Coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Grocery Store is the base category. Odds ratio are displayed
and their correspondent standard errors are in parenthesis below.
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.6: Multinomial Logit Separated by Shopping Modes
Panel A: Primary Shopping Trips
Drugstore Mass Mer-
chandiser
Supercenter Clubstore Convenience
Store
Others
Income 0.996*** 0.999 0.993*** 1.006*** 0.989*** 0.997***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size
0.807*** 1.107*** 1.182*** 1.216*** 0.919*** 0.911***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.02) (0.013)
Black 2.212*** 1.518*** 0.894* 1.035 1.703*** 2.194***
(0.144) (0.095) (0.052) (0.061) (0.131) (0.126)
Asian 1.867*** 1.093 0.149*** 2.025*** 1.177 2.027***
(0.178) (0.096) (0.015) (0.143) (0.157) (0.143)
Other Ethnicity 1.56*** 1.315*** 0.646*** 1.227*** 1.395*** 1.744***
(0.122) (0.091) (0.041) (0.076) (0.132) (0.106)
Constant 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.072*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.097***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Number of Observations 371943 371943 371943 371943 371943 371943
Number of Households 8533 8533 8533 8533 8533 8533
***Household Random Coefficients
Variance 2.894218 (.05460514)
Panel B: Secondary Shopping Trips
Drugstore Mass Mer-
chandiser
Supercenter Clubstore Convenience
Store
Others
Income 0.999** 1.003*** 0.997*** 1.009*** 0.996*** 0.998***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size
0.925*** 1.149*** 1.169*** 1.16*** 0.985 0.964***
(0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.008)
Black 1.353*** 0.909*** 0.709*** 0.735*** 1.097** 1.494***
(0.047) (0.032) (0.025) (0.028) (0.041) (0.049)
Asian 0.467*** 0.237*** 0.075*** 0.373*** 0.175*** 0.359***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.004) (0.015) (0.01) (0.011)
Other Ethnicity 0.895*** 0.905*** 0.557*** 0.783*** 0.87*** 1.084***
(0.032) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant 0.125*** 0.084*** 0.1*** 0.036*** 0.07*** 0.407***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
Number of Observations 613071 613071 613071 613071 613071 613071
Number of Households 8502 8502 8502 8502 8502 8502
***Household Random Coefficients
Variance 1.2543657 (.02143746)
Note: Household Random Coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Grocery Store is the base category. Odds ratio are displayed
and their correspondent standard errors are in parenthesis below.
s
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.7: Multinomial Logit Separated by Shopping Modes
Panel A: Primary Shopping Trips
Drugstore Mass Mer-
chandiser
Supercenter Clubstore Convenience
Store
Others
Income 0.995*** 0.999 0.994*** 1.006*** 0.992*** 0.997***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size
0.799*** 1.087*** 1.184*** 1.198*** 0.879*** 0.899***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02) (0.013)
Black 2.149*** 1.663*** 0.813*** 1.032 1.834*** 2.114***
(0.143) (0.105) (0.049) (0.062) (0.144) (0.122)
Asian 1.711*** 1.142 0.225*** 1.974*** 1.203 1.975***
(0.166) (0.101) (0.025) (0.14) (0.162) (0.142)
Other Ethnicity 1.584*** 1.509*** 0.732*** 1.228*** 1.396*** 1.789***
(0.14) (0.121) (0.057) (0.091) (0.151) (0.13)
Number of Supercenters 0.996 0.996* 1.102*** 0.998 0.99*** 1.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Number of Club Stores 0.994** 1.009*** 0.92*** 1.01*** 1 0.993***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.06*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.103***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) -0.001 (0.006)
***Household Random Co-
efficients
X X X X X X
Panel B: Secondary Shopping Trips
Drugstore Mass Mer-
chandiser
Supercenter Clubstore Convenience
Store
Others
Income 0.998*** 1.002*** 0.999** 1.007*** 0.996*** 0.998***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size
0.92*** 1.135*** 1.189*** 1.148*** 0.96*** 0.952***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Black 1.395*** 1.016 0.664*** 0.75*** 1.202*** 1.48***
(0.057) (0.042) (0.028) (0.033) (0.053) (0.058)
Asian 0.844*** 0.46*** 0.169*** 0.736*** 0.36*** 0.712***
(0.035) (0.02) (0.012) (0.033) (0.022) (0.026)
Other Ethnicity 1.011 1.059 0.792*** 0.877*** 0.915* 1.239***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.035) (0.039) (0.043) (0.046)
Number of Supercenters 0.99*** 0.983*** 1.085*** 0.999 0.992*** 1.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Club Stores 0.997** 1.014*** 0.935*** 1.011*** 1.001 0.993***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.15*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.033*** 0.074*** 0.463***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018)
***Household Random Co-
efficients
X X X X X X
Note: Household Random Coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Grocery Store is the base category. Odds ratio are displayed
and their correspondent standard errors are in parenthesis below.
s
Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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3.A.3 Other Information
List of variables of the AC Nielsen Homescan Data R©
1. Household ID: uniquely identifies the individual households in the Nielsen
panel.
2. Purchase date: year, month, and day of the month in which the purchase
was made.
3. Store names: 659 stores in total.
4. Store Zip Code: the zip code for the store where the item was pur-
chased. Not available for every store. In particular it is not available for
drugstores, convenience stores, and “others”.
5. Channel Type names: traditional grocery stores (e.g. Shaws and Stop
N Shop), drugstores (e.g. CVS), convenience stores, mass merchandis-
ers (e.g. Target Regular, K Market Big and Shopko Discount), super-
centers (K Market Super, Walmart Super and Target Super), clubstores
(e.g. Cotsco, Warehouse club and Sams) and others (e.g. Godiva, Book-
store/News and Dollar Tree)
6. Product module: four digit code which identifies the product categories.
7. Brand.
8. Product Size 1: identifies the size of the item in the transaction (can be
count, dry or fluid ounces).
9. Product size2:product size in equivalent units. Not available for all items
and product modules.
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10. Multi-pack: identifies whether the item is a single (can, box, etc.) or a
multiple pack (e-pack, 3-pack, 6pack, etc.).
11. UPC Code.
12. UPC Description.
13. Quantity: the number of units of this item purchased (i.e. boxes, cans,
bottle, etc).
14. Price Paid Deal: actually the expenditure for a sale priced item.
15. Price Paid Non-deal: actually the expenditure for a regular priced item.
16. Coupon Value: the value of any coupon used for the purchase.
17. Organic Claim: indicates if the item has an organic claim.
18. USDA Organic Seal: indicates if the item has an organic seal.
19. Product Group: an identifier that allows aggregation of items and prod-
uct modules into designated groups.
20. Department: an identifier that allows aggregation of items, product mod-
ules, or product groups into store departments.
21. Additional variables: Flavor, Form, Formula, Salt-content, Style, Type,
Product Variety . Not available for all products.
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